A dynamic common-property resource problem with potential regime shifts
A dynamic common-property resource problem with potential regime shifts
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发表时间：
2013-03
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通讯作者：
Hironao Sakamoto
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作者：
Hironao Sakamoto
本文提供了一个总体框架，与潜在的政权转移的动态问题，可以分析在战略环境中，以及从社会规划师的角度。这种游戏描述的一个典型情况是共同开发一种共同财产资源，如湖泊、森林、海洋鱼类种群，以及更大规模的全球气候系统。通过将该框架应用于一个简单的动态公共财产资源问题，我们表明，当风险是内生的，潜在的政权转移可以促进预防性管理的公共财产资源，即使在战略环境。它还表明，存在一个资源枯竭陷阱，其中政权的转变，一旦发生，触发资源积累动态的逆转，可能导致资源基础的崩溃。
This paper provides a general framework with which a dynamic problem with potential regime shifts can be analyzed in a strategic environment as well as from social planner’s perspective. A typical situation described by such a game is the joint exploitation of a common-property resource such as lakes, forests, marine fish populations, and at a larger scale the global climate system. By applying the framework to a simple dynamic common-property resource problem, we show that when the risk is endogenous, potential of regime shifts can facilitate precautionary management of common-property resources even in a strategic environment. It is also shown that there exists a resource-depletion trap in which a regime shift, once it happens, triggers a reversal of resource accumulation dynamics, possibly leading to a collapse of resource base.