Designing an EU Intervention Standard for Digital Platforms
Designing an EU Intervention Standard for Digital Platforms
复制标题
设计欧盟数字平台干预标准
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3544694
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Alexandre de Streel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Alexiadis;Alexandre de Streel
世界各地正在形成一种共识，即决策者需要解决数字平台或数字生态系统产生的某些特点和竞争趋势，以期改革现有的公共政策工具，使其适应数字时代。本文首先回顾了欧盟竞争法和经济法规下的相关先例，这一改革可以依据这些先例。然后，文件提出了调整竞争规则的建议，特别是关于确定市场力量的建议（例如，通过更好地考虑到生态系统的影响、潜在竞争的影响和创新的作用）和应用危害理论（即通过侧重于杠杆作用和竞争行为、获得关键创新能力、歧视和自我偏好以及违反规范性监管原则）。然后，本文提出了一个累积的“三标准测试”，以确定竞争规则和可能的补充监管应该关注的数字平台类型。这三项标准要求评估：（一）高度集中和不稳定的市场结构的存在;（二）作为不可避免的贸易伙伴的数字看门人的存在;（三）为事前监管的目的，缺乏有效的竞争规则来解决市场中发现的问题。该论文还考虑了可以对这些已确定的数字平台施加的补救措施类型，包括：互操作性和数据等关键创新能力的获取;禁止反竞争歧视;以及促进消费者转换。鉴于技术的迅速发展和市场的不确定性，应考虑是否应以与直接受措施影响的行业利益攸关方共同参与的方式实施这些补救措施。最后，本文件讨论了通过这种法律的标准所引起的一些程序和体制问题，建议调整现有的反托拉斯准则，扩大竞争总局的权力，以进行全面的市场调查（如英国和澳大利亚的情况），并可能与国家监管机构密切合作，在欧盟一级与他们的协调可以说是需要加强的。
A consensus is emerging around the world about the need for policymakers to address certain characteristics and competitive tendencies that are generated by digital platforms or digital ecosystems, with a view to reforming the public policy instruments currently in place so that they are fit for the digital age. The paper starts by reviewing the relevant precedents under EU competition law and economic regulation upon which this reform could be based. The paper then puts forward recommendations to adapt competition rules, in particular as regards the determination of market power (e.g., by better taking into account the effects of ecosystems, the impact of potential competition and the role of innovation) and the application of theories of harm (i.e. by focusing on leveraging and envelopment behaviour, access to key innovation capabilities, discrimination and self-preferencing and the violation of normative regulatory principles). The paper then proceeds to propose a cumulative 'three criteria test' to determine the types of digital platforms upon which competition rules, and possibly complementary regulation, should focus. These three criteria require an assessment of: (i) the existence of market structures which are highly concentrated and non-contestable; (ii) the presence of digital gatekeepers which act as unavoidable trading partners; (iii) and, for the purposes of ex ante regulation, the lack of effectiveness of competition rules to address the identified problems in the market. The paper also considers the types of remedies that could be imposed on those identified digital platforms, including: interoperability and access to key innovation capabilities such as data; the prohibition of anti-competitive discrimination; and the facilitation of consumer switching. Given the rapid evolution of technology and market uncertainty, consideration should be given as to whether these remedies should be imposed in a participatory manner with the industry stakeholders directly affected by the measures. Finally, the paper deals with a number of procedural and institutional issues raised by the adoption of such a legal standard, proposing to adapt existing antitrust guidelines, to extend the power of DG Competition to conduct fully fledged market investigations (as is the case in the UK and Australia) and possibly to work closely with National Regulatory Agencies, coordination with whom at EU level arguably needs to be strengthened.