Features and prospect of China’s national GHG emissions trading scheme
Features and prospect of China’s national GHG emissions trading scheme
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DOI：
10.1080/17583004.2020.1721975
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发表时间：
2020-02
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
H. Niizawa;D. Hayashi;Xianbing Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Niizawa;D. Hayashi;Xianbing Liu
摘要中国于2017年12月宣布启动国家排放交易计划（ETS），以监管其二氧化碳排放。在排放权交易中，中国可能会遇到与欧盟和其他发达国家不同的问题。本研究首先确定了影响中国国家ETS设计和影响其绩效的背景因素。在概述了中国国家排放交易系统的设计之后，本研究重点关注两个关键特征：（1）根据实际产出水平对初始配额分配进行事后调整;（2）对电力部门的处理。最后，本研究分析了中国国家排放交易体系与一些重叠政策（如空气污染控制政策）之间的相互作用。该研究的主要发现是，由于其设计，中国的ETS不能完全实现成本效益，中国的ETS的价格行为将不同于总量管制和交易ETS，以及重叠的政策，如节能和/或空气质量改善的命令和控制法规，将减少对配额的需求，并限制配额交易的机会。这些发现是基于现有的理论研究和相关的全球ETS经验。
Abstract China announced the launch of a national emissions trading scheme (ETS) in December 2017 for the regulation of its carbon dioxides emissions. In emissions trading, China is likely to encounter issues different from those encountered by the European Union and other developed countries. This study first identifies the contextual factors that influence the design of China’s national ETS and affect its performance. After an overview of the design of China’s national ETS, this study focuses on two key features: (1) ex-post adjustment of the initial allowance allocation in proportion to the actual output levels, and (2) treatment of the power sector. Finally, the study analyzes the interaction between China’s national ETS and some overlapping policies such as those on air pollution control. The study’s key findings are that China’s ETS cannot fully achieve cost-effectiveness because of its design, the price behavior of China’s ETS will be different from that of a cap-and-trade ETS, and overlapping policies such as the command-and-control regulations for energy conservation and/or air quality improvement will decrease the demand for allowances and limit the opportunity for allowance trading. These findings are based on existing theoretical studies and relevant global ETS experience.