Are You Paying Your Employees to Cheat? An Experimental Investigation
Are You Paying Your Employees to Cheat? An Experimental Investigation
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你付钱给你的员工来作弊吗？
DOI：
10.2202/1935-1682.2481
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
F. Tapon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Fei Song;F. Tapon
摘要：我们通过使用显着财务激励措施的实验室实验，将基于目标的薪酬与线性计件工资和基于锦标赛的奖金制度下的绩效失实陈述进行比较。采用字谜游戏作为实验任务。结果显示，这三种方案的生产率相似且在统计上没有区别。相比之下，无论是考虑超额索赔的单词数量、发生超额索赔的工作/工资周期数，还是至少一次超额索赔的参与者数量，基于目标的薪酬都会比其他两个系统中的任何一个系统产生更多的作弊行为。虽然早期的研究将基于目标的薪酬下的作弊与基于非绩效的薪酬下的作弊进行了比较，后者不提供作弊的经济激励，但这是第一项将基于目标的计划下的作弊与其他基于绩效的计划下的作弊进行比较的研究。结果表明，在不完全放弃绩效工资的情况下，可以减少作为激励措施的作弊行为。
Abstract We compare, through a laboratory experiment using salient financial incentives, misrepresentations of performance under target-based compensation with those under both a linear piece-rate and a tournament-based bonus system. An anagram game was employed as the experimental task. Results show that productivity was similar and statistically indistinguishable under the three schemes. In contrast, whether one considers the number of overclaimed words, the number of work/pay periods in which overclaims occur, or the number of participants making an overclaim at least once, target-based compensation produced significantly more cheating than either of the other two systems. While earlier research has compared cheating under target-based compensation with cheating under non-performance-based compensation, which offers no financial incentive to cheat, this is the first study that compares cheating under target-based schemes to cheating under other performance-based schemes. The results suggest that cheating as a response to incentives can be mitigated without giving up performance pay altogether.