On cash and conviction Monetary sanctions as misguided policy
On cash and conviction Monetary sanctions as misguided policy
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1745-9133.2011.00726.x
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发表时间：
2011-08-01
影响因子：
4.6
通讯作者：
Harris, Alexes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Beckett, Katherine;Harris, Alexes
现在，美国各地的法院和其他刑事司法机构经常收取巨额费用和罚款。本文总结了美国实施货币制裁的研究，并展示了它们与欧洲罚款的不同之处。在当代美国，在大多数重罪和轻罪案件中，法院规定的法定经济义务是对其他刑事处罚的补充。法官根据自己的判断收取许多费用和罚款，来自华盛顿州的证据表明，包括种族在内的法外因素影响了他们的评估。许多州还授权监狱、矫正部门和缓刑办公室征收费用。在美国，费用和罚款金额由法律决定，与被告的收入无关。最近的研究表明，对这些罚款的评估往往会产生相对于预期收入而言相当大的长期债务，并阻碍重返社会。政策影响本文认为，广泛和酌情施加实质性和补充经济处罚的缺点超过了与这种做法相关的任何好处。惩教费用和法庭费用的支持者认为，罪犯——而不是纳税人——应该为惩罚他们的罪行付出代价。罪犯应该为刑事司法支出买单的想法是一种道德和政治主张，可能具有广泛的吸引力。尽管如此，这一说法至少与另外两个重要原则存在冲突。首先，公共刑法制度的前提是犯罪主要是对国家的侵害；违反刑法的行为被认为是严重的，足以保证国家篡夺争端解决程序。强迫被告偿还国家的刑事司法开支与这一原则相矛盾。此外，与其他收费服务的用户不同，受惩罚的对象是被迫参与这些服务的；他们不能使用更少的，也不能寻找替代供应商。有人认为，如果国家强迫犯罪对象使用（通常是昂贵且无效的）国家“服务”，那么政府就有义务为此买单。事实上，这种财政义务可以说是对政府权力的重要制衡。因此，在评估费用以收回刑事司法支出的适当性方面存在着相互竞争的道德和政治争论。即使被普遍接受，罪犯应该为他们的判决、惩罚和改造付出代价的想法也必须与政策和实际考虑以及与正义和公平有关的道德问题相平衡。我们的分析只涉及当代美国的收费和罚款的征收，并不适用于欧洲式的日罚款征收。对大量和非分级收费和罚款的广泛评估缺乏令人信服的刑罚依据，与促进重返社会的政策努力不相容，并引起了对正义和公平的许多关切。至少在理论上，刑罚政策的目标是使人丧失行为能力、改过自新、威慑和报复。货币制裁似乎无法实现这些目标中的任何一个。根据定义，货币制裁不能通过使罪犯丧失行为能力来防止犯罪。从理论上讲，如果货币制裁的废除是作为参与康复计划或亲社会结果的奖励，那么货币制裁可能具有康复作用。然而，法律债务的免除通常不是对良好行为的奖励。为了有效地震慑不法行为，在潜在的违法者考虑他们的选择时，必须让他们知道惩罚的后果；快速和确定是关键。但对货币制裁的评估既不迅速也不确定。最后，由于罚金在美国是对已经比较严厉的刑事处罚的补充，直接对被定罪的罪犯的伴侣和子女产生不利影响，并且通常在所有其他刑事判决要素完成后很长时间内仍然有效，因此它们与罪行不成比例，因此接近报复而不是报复。货币制裁也使重返社会复杂化。据估计，每年有70万名囚犯从监狱或监狱返回公民社会。在这方面，研究人员和决策者日益强调有必要促进罪犯的重新融入社会和稳定。然而，有证据表明，普遍征收的巨额且不分等级的学费和罚款阻碍了重返校园。例如，法律债务往往是长期的，因为受到刑事制裁的人的盈利能力较低，所施加的制裁的规模大，以及利息的累积。因此，刑事司法系统施加的货币制裁对有刑事定罪的人构成了额外的、实质性的、往往是长期的经济责任。像其他类型的债务一样，法定债务减少了获得住房、信贷和就业的机会；它还限制了改善一个人的教育或职业状况的可能性。未付的法律债务可能导致逮捕令、逮捕和/或监禁。在一些地方，法定债务人也无法获得驾驶执照，这种做法给就业造成了额外的障碍。因此，法律债务对拥有它的人有各种不利和不稳定的后果，包括被逮捕和监禁的威胁。在美国广泛实施和征收实质性和补充性的货币制裁也引起了对公平和正义的若干重要关切。特别是，不分等级的罚金加重了已经很严重的监禁判决，给穷人造成了不成比例的负担，而且至少在华盛顿州受到包括种族在内的各种法外因素的影响。这些惩罚也直接和不利地影响到家庭成员，经常导致债务人被捕和监禁，并提出关于吉迪恩诉温赖特案（1963年）的意义和遗产的重要问题。此外，收取费用和罚款以资助政府运作对国家的财政效益是不确定的。要全面评估征收费用和罚款对国家的财政效益，就必须考虑到与征收最低限度税收有关的直接和间接成本。不清楚的是，如果有必要的数据，这一数学计算的结果是否会表明征收和征收终身财产税是一项净财政收益。即使来自收费和罚款的收入大于用于收取这些费用的支出，刑事司法行动对这种私人资金来源的依赖也可能损害法院的廉正，并给法官造成利益冲突。本文的结论是，美国刑事司法机构普遍实施的非分级、补充性和实质性的罚款缺乏令人信服的刑罚依据，与促进重返社会的政策努力不相容，引起了对公平和正义的重要关注，对国家的经济利益不确定，并且可以说损害了法院的诚信。
Substantial fees and fines now are now routinely imposed by courts and other criminal justice agencies across the United States. This article summarizes research on the imposition of monetary sanctions in the United States and shows how they differ from European day fines. In the contemporary United States, court-imposed legal financial obligations supplement other criminal penalties in the majority of felony and misdemeanor cases. Judges impose many fees and fines at their discretion, and evidence from Washington State indicates that extralegal factors-including ethnicity-influence their assessment. Many states have also authorized jails, departments of correction, and probation offices to levy fees. In the United States, fees and fine amounts are determined by statute and are not tethered to defendants' earnings. Recent studies suggest that the assessment of these penalties often generate long-term debts that are sizeable relative to expected earnings and impede reintegration.Policy ImplicationsThis essay contends that the disadvantages of the widespread and discretionary imposition of substantial and supplementary financial penalties outweigh any benefits associated with this practice. Proponents of correctional and court fees argue that offenders-not taxpayers-should pay for the cost of punishing their misdeeds. The idea that offenders should foot the bill for criminal justice expenditures is a moral and political claim, one that likely has broad appeal. Nonetheless, this claim is in tension with at least two other important principles. First, public criminal law systems rest on the premise that crime is mainly a wrong against the state; violations of criminal law are thought to be significant enough to warrant the state's usurpation of the dispute resolution process. Compelling defendants to reimburse the state for its criminal justice expenditures is in tension with this principle. Moreover, unlike users of other services for which fees are assessed, penal targets are compelled to partake of these services; they cannot use fewer of them or look for an alternative provider of them. It can be argued that if the state compels penal targets to use (often expensive and ineffective) state "services," then the government is obligated to pay for them. Indeed, this fiscal obligation is arguably an important check on government power.Competing moral and political arguments regarding the appropriateness of assessing fees to recoup criminal justice expenditures thus exist. Even if it were universally accepted, the idea that offenders should pay for their adjudication, punishment and rehabilitation must be balanced against policy and practical considerations, as well as against ethical issues concerning justice and fairness. Our analysis pertains only to the imposition of fees and fines in the contemporary United States and does not extend to European-style imposition of day fines. The widespread assessment of substantial and nongraduated fees and fines lacks a convincing penological rationale, is incompatible with policy efforts to facilitate reintegration, and raises numerous concerns about justice and fairness.At least in theory, penal policies are aimed at incapacitation, rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribution. Monetary sanctions do not appear to accomplish any of these goals. By definition, monetary sanctions do not prevent crime by incapacitating offenders. Theoretically, monetary sanctions might be rehabilitative if their repeal was offered as a reward for participation in rehabilitative programs or prosocial outcomes. Yet erasure of legal debt generally is not offered as a reward for good behavior. For a penalty to effectively deter wrong-doing, its consequences must be known to potential offenders as they contemplate their options; swiftness and certainty are key. But the assessment of monetary sanctions is characterized by neither swiftness nor certainty. Finally, because monetary penalties in the United States are supplements to criminal penalties that already are comparatively severe, directly and adversely impact the partners and children of the criminally convicted, and typically remain in effect long after all other elements of criminal sentences are completed, they are disproportionate to the offense and, hence, approach vengeance rather than retribution.Monetary sanctions also complicate reintegration. An estimated 700,000 inmates return to civil society from jail or prison every year. In this context, researchers and policy makers increasingly emphasize the need to facilitate the reintegration and stabilization of the criminally convicted. Yet there is evidence that the widespread imposition of substantial and nongraduated fees and fines impedes reentry. For example, legal debt tends to be long term due to the low earning power of the criminally sanctioned, the magnitude of the sanctions imposed, and the accrual of interest. Monetary sanctions imposed by the criminal justice system thus constitute an additional, substantial, and often long-term financial liability for people living with a criminal conviction. Like other types of debt, legal debt reduces access to housing, credit, and employment; it also limits possibilities for improving one's educational or occupational situation. Unpaid legal debt can lead to a warrant, an arrest, and/or incarceration. In some locales, legal debtors also are denied drivers' licenses, a practice that creates an additional barrier to employment. Legal debt thus has a variety of adverse and destabilizing consequences for those who possess it, including the threat of arrest and incarceration.The widespread imposition and collection of substantial and supplementary monetary sanctions in the United States also raises several important concerns about fairness and justice. In particular, nongraduated monetary penalties supplement already severe confinement sentences, impose a disproportionate burden on the poor, and are, at least in Washington State, influenced by various extralegal factors, including ethnicity. These penalties also directly and adversely affect family members, lead with some frequency to the arrest and incarceration of debtors, and raise important questions about the meaning and legacy of Gideon v. Wainwright (1963). Moreover, the collection of fees and fines to fund government operations is of uncertain fiscal benefit to the state. A comprehensive assessment of the fiscal benefit to the state of imposing fees and fines must consider both the direct and indirect costs associated with the collection of LFOs. It is unclear that the results of this mathematical exercise would, if the necessary data were available, show that the imposition and collection of LFOs is a net financial gain. Even if revenues from fees and fines are greater than the expenditures devoted to their collection, dependence on this private funding source for criminal justice operations arguably compromises the integrity of courts and creates conflicts of interest for judges.This essay concludes that the widespread imposition of nongraduated, supplementary and substantial monetary penalties by U.S. criminal justice agencies lacks a convincing penological rationale, is incompatible with policy efforts to facilitate reentry, raises important concerns about fairness and justice, is of uncertain financial benefit to the state, and arguably compromises the integrity of the courts.