Rethinking central planning: A federal critique of the Planning Commission
Rethinking central planning: A federal critique of the Planning Commission
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重新思考中央计划：联邦对计划委员会的批评
DOI：
10.1080/14736489.2017.1279925
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
R. Saxena
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wilfried Swenden;R. Saxena
摘要本文批判性地评估了印度计划委员会对中央国家关系的影响。它认为，规划委员会由于其在监督五年期和年度规划方面的作用、对设计和监督中央赞助计划的贡献以及参与酌情赠款的发放而具有集中作用。中央政策的优先事项和国家间的分歧使计划委员会无法发挥共享规则机构的作用，从而无法抵消上述政策的集中影响。文章然后推测是什么促使最近更换计划委员会与NITI Aayog，这可能意味着共享规则和合作联邦制的性质在印度更普遍。
ABSTRACT This article critically assesses the impact of the Planning Commission on center-state relations in India. It argues that the Planning Commission had a centralizing effect due to its role in overseeing five year and annual planning, its contribution to designing and overseeing Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS), and its involvement in discretionary grant-making. Central policy priorities and inter-state disagreements prevented the Planning Commission from acquiring the role of a shared rule institution, capable of offsetting the centralizing implications of the aforementioned policies. The article then speculates on what prompted the recent replacement of the Planning Commission with the NITI Aayog and what this may mean for shared rule and the nature of collaborative federalism in India more in general.