Equilibrium selection for multi-portfolio optimization
Equilibrium selection for multi-portfolio optimization
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DOI:
10.1016/j.ejor.2021.02.033
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发表时间:
2021-02
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Lorenzo Lampariello;C. Neumann;J. M. Ricci;Simone Sagratella;O. Stein
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文献类型:
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作者:
Lorenzo Lampariello;C. Neumann;J. M. Ricci;Simone Sagratella;O. Stein
We analyze a Nash equilibrium problem arising when trades from different accounts are pooled for execution. We introduce a new general multi-portfolio model and state sufficient conditions for the monotonicity of the underlying Nash equilibrium problem. Monotonicity makes it possible to treat the problem numerically and, for the case of nonunique equilibria, to solve hierarchical problems of equilibrium selection. We also give sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibrium problem formulation to be a potential game. Our computational experience confirms the theoretical insights and substantiates the significance of the equilibrium selection.