Inducing Downstream Selling Effort with Market Share Discounts
Inducing Downstream Selling Effort with Market Share Discounts
复制标题
通过市场份额折扣诱导下游销售努力
DOI：
10.1080/13571516.2010.483082
复制
发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
David E. Mills
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David E. Mills
抽象忠诚度折扣和回扣是一种定价方案，为达到或超过特定销售门槛的买家提供激励。在市场份额折扣的情况下，门槛以买方总购买量的百分比表示。虽然市场份额折扣在某些情况下可能具有排他性效果，但也有看似合理的非排他性理由提供这种折扣。本文探讨了两个原因--租金抽取和诱导下游销售努力。本文考虑了一个制造商通过一个异质的、非排他性零售商网络销售差异化商品的案例。制造商提供市场份额折扣，以诱导非收缩销售努力，如特定品牌的信息或来自具有某些不可观察到的特征的零售商的客户服务。在某些情况下，与线性定价相比，市场份额折扣会导致更多的销售努力并改善市场表现。在其他情况下，它们对总收益没有影响，只是将诱导销售努力产生的租金上游转移到制造商手中。在任何情况下，只要替代产品生产商保持足够的销售额以维持生存，市场份额折扣就不会损害市场表现。
Abstract Loyalty discounts and rebates are pricing schemes that offer incentives to buyers for reaching or exceeding certain sales thresholds. In the case of market share discounts, thresholds are expressed as a percentage of the buyer’s total purchase requirements. Although market share discounts may have exclusionary effects under certain circumstances when a seller has significant market power, there are plausible non‐exclusionary reasons for offering them as well. Two such reasons – rent extraction and inducing downstream selling effort – are explored in this paper. The paper considers the case of a manufacturer who sells a differentiated good through a network of heterogeneous, non‐exclusive retailers. The manufacturer offers market share discounts to induce non‐contractible selling effort such as brand‐specific information or customer service from those retailers who possess certain unobservable characteristics. In some instances, market share discounts induce increased selling effort and improve market performance as compared to linear pricing. In other instances, they have no effect on aggregate benefits, but merely shift the rents created by induced selling effort upstream to the manufacturer. In no instance, as long as the producers of substitute goods retain sufficient sales to remain viable, do market share discounts impair market performance.