Board Hierarchy, Independent Directors, and Firm Value: Evidence from China
Board Hierarchy, Independent Directors, and Firm Value: Evidence from China
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2638512
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发表时间：
2016-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Jigao Zhu;Kangtao Ye;J. Tucker;Kam C. Chan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jigao Zhu;Kangtao Ye;J. Tucker;Kam C. Chan
虽然美国公司主要是将董事会名单列在最后，但中国公司的情况并非如此，大多数中国公司将独立董事名单列在最后。我们将中国董事的上市顺序解释为董事会层级，反映了董事会内部的权力分配。基于现有的证据表明，独立董事有助于公司价值和授权的个人有更多的影响力，在群体决策，我们预计独立董事的排名与公司价值呈正相关，并找到与此预测相一致的证据。在我们的补充分析中，我们探讨了授权独立董事提高公司价值的机制。我们发现，排名较高的独立董事更有可能投票反对管理层，特别是在财务报告问题上。此外，独立董事排名越高，盈余管理越少。我们的研究表明，授权独立董事增加公司价值。
While US companies mainly list their board of directors alphabetically, this is not the case for Chinese companies, most of which list their independent directors last. We interpret the listing order of Chinese directors as board hierarchy, reflecting power allocation within the board. Based on extant evidence that independent directors contribute to firm value and that empowered individuals have more influence in group decision making, we expect independent-director rankings to be positively associated with firm value and find evidence consistent with this prediction. In our supplementary analyses we explore the mechanisms through which empowered independent directors enhance firm value. We find that independent directors who are ranked higher are more likely to vote against the management, especially on financial reporting issues. Further, higher independent-director rankings are associated with less earnings management. Our study suggests that empowering independent directors increases firm value.