Provision of Public Goods on Networks: On Existence, Uniqueness, and Centralities
Provision of Public Goods on Networks: On Existence, Uniqueness, and Centralities
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网络公共产品的提供：论存在性、唯一性和中心性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
6.6
通讯作者：
M. Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Parinaz Naghizadeh;M. Liu
我们考虑在战略代理人网络上提供公共产品。我们研究了这些网络博弈的不同努力结果，即纳什均衡、帕累托有效努力分布和半合作均衡(由代理之间的相互作用产生)。利用这些结果与线性互补问题之间的联系，我们在网络结构上确定了纳什均衡唯一的充要条件。我们证明了我们的发现统一并推广了文献中的现有结果。在模型的两个极端，即战略互补博弈和战略替代博弈，我们还证明了两类博弈存在纳什均衡的条件。我们通过将代理的决策与其在交互网络中的中心性联系起来，提供了代理在纳什均衡以及帕累托有效结果和半合作均衡的努力的图论解释。利用这种联系，我们分离了传入和传出边对代理努力的影响，并发现了网络中不同长度的步长的交替影响。
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (resulting from interactions among coalitions of agents). We identify necessary and sufficient conditions on the structure of the network for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium by using a connection between these outcomes and linear complementarity problems. We show that our finding unifies, and extends, existing results in the literature. We also identify conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria for two subclasses of games at the two extremes of our model, namely games of strategic complements and games of strategic substitutes. We provide a graph-theoretical interpretation of agents’ efforts at the Nash equilibrium, as well as the Pareto efficient outcomes and semi-cooperative equilibria, by linking an agent's decision to her centrality in the interaction network. Using this connection, we separate the effects of incoming and outgoing edges on agents’ efforts and uncover an alternating effect over walks of different length in the network.
影响因子：
5.6
作者：
Foster AD;Rosenzweig MR
通讯作者：
Rosenzweig MR