Determinants of corporate pension funding strategy
Determinants of corporate pension funding strategy
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企业年金筹资策略的决定因素
DOI：
10.1016/0165-4101(87)90016-4
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发表时间：
1987
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
S. Reiter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jere R. Francis;S. Reiter
本文以255家企业为样本，采用横截面回归模型对有关养老基金筹资策略的若干假设进行了检验。结果与以下解释一致：(1)高水平融资的财政激励（税收优惠和财政宽松），(2)低水平融资的劳动力激励，以及(3)与高水平融资的政治成本和低水平融资的债务承包成本相关的财务报表激励。养老基金的筹资策略似乎很复杂，涉及到筹资激励之间的权衡。这些相互作用和权衡的性质仍需通过未来的研究来澄清。
Several hypotheses concerning pension funding strategy are tested in a cross-sectional regression model on a sample of 255 firms. Results are consistent with the following explanations: (1) finance incentives (tax benefits and financial slack) for high-level funding, (2) labor incentives for low-level funding, and (3) financial statement incentives relating to political costs for high-level funding and debt contracting costs for low-level funding. Pension funding strategy appears to be complex, involving tradeoffs between funding incentives. The nature of these interactions and tradeoffs remains to be clarified through future research.