Interventionism and Epiphenomenalsim
Interventionism and Epiphenomenalsim
复制标题
干预主义与副现象主义
DOI：
10.1080/00455091.2010.10716727
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Michael Baumgartner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Michael Baumgartner
夏皮罗和索伯 (2007) 所追求的中心目标之一是证明他们所谓的副现象论的主要论证（一种因果排除论证）失败了。根据（Shapiro and Sober 2007）中采用的术语，副现象命名论指的是这样的论点：伴随的宏观属性（或变量或因素）对微观属性没有因果影响，而微观属性是由这些宏观属性的微观附带基础引起的。众所周知的经典排除论证旨在产生这种从宏观到微观的副现象论，其推理如下：遵循广泛接受的物理因果封闭原则，每个微观结果都存在一个因果充分的微观原因；如果另外假设宏观属性伴随着微观属性而不与后者相同（或可还原），并且如果——鉴于因果过度决定的情况很少见——假设微观效应不是系统地过度决定的，那么宏观属性相对于其微观附带基础的影响是因果惰性的。
One of the central objectives Shapiro and Sober pursue in (2007) is to show that what they call the master argument for epiphenomenalism, which is a type of causal exclusion argument, fails. Epiphe nomenalism, according to the terminology adopted in (Shapiro and Sober 2007), designates the thesis that supervening macro properties (or variables or factors) have no causal influence on micro proper ties that are caused by the micro supervenience bases of those macro properties. Well-known classical exclusion arguments are designed to yield such macro-tomicro epiphenomenalism along the lines of the following reasoning: subject to the widely accepted principle of the causal closure of the physical, there exists a causally sufficient micro cause for every micro effect; if it is additionally assumed that macro properties supervene on micro properties without being identical (or reducible) to the latter and if — in light of the rareness of cases of causal overdetermination — micro effects are assumed not to be systematically overdetermined, it follows that macro properties are causally inert with respect to effects of their micro supervenience bases.