I Know What You're Thinking - Brain imaging and mental privacy
I Know What You're Thinking - Brain imaging and mental privacy
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我知道你在想什么——大脑成像和心理隐私
DOI：
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199596492.003.0004
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Bayne T
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Bayne T
大多数动物都有这样或那样的精神状态，但很少有物种拥有我们的自我意识能力。我们通过内省意识到我们自己的精神状态，我们通过他们的言行意识到我们人类同胞的精神状态。本章并不关注这些传统形式的读心术--它们的起源早于有记载的历史的开端--而是关注一种相当不同的、明显更近的“读心术”能力的前景：根据来自神经成像的信息将精神状态归因于生物的能力。几十年来，我们可能通过检查大脑来阅读思想的想法激发了哲学兴趣（Dennett 1978），但是随着神经成像的最新进展，这个想法现在已经从科幻小说变成了科学：读脑-或者“大脑解码”，因为它也被称为现在是一个新兴的产业。这里有三个关于大脑阅读或至少是尝试过的大脑阅读的例子。在一项研究中，海恩斯及其同事要求受试者决定是增加还是减少两个数字（海恩斯等人，2007;另见海恩斯，本卷）。根据功能磁共振成像数据，实验者能够以高达70%的准确率确定受试者是否会将呈现的数字相加，或者他们是否会从另一个数字中减去一个数字。在另一项研究中，Spence及其同事提出，基于神经影像学证据，一名因故意诱导儿童患病而被定罪的妇女可能是无辜的（Spence et al. 2008）。在第三项研究中，Owen和他的同事得出结论，植物人状态患者是有意识的，因为当她被指示想象自己打网球或想象自己参观自己家的房间时，她在与运动想象和空间导航有关的大脑区域显示出神经活动（参见Boly et al. 2007; Monti/Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2010）。这些研究本身就很有趣，但它们也提出了关于基于大脑的读心术的性质和范围的更普遍的问题。其中一组问题与读脑的方法有关。一个人如何根据神经成像数据证明一种精神状态归属于一种生物？第二组问题涉及读心术的范围。在什么样的条件下，以及在哪种精神状态下，读脑是可能的？第三组问题涉及
Most animals have mental states of one sort or another, but few species share our capacity for self-awareness. We are aware of our own mental states via introspection, and we are aware of the mental states of our fellow human beings on the basis of what they do and say. This chapter is not concerned with these traditional forms of mindreading-forms whose origins predate the beginnings of recorded history—but with the prospects of a rather different and significantly more recent ‘mindreading'capacity: the capacity to ascribe mental states to a creature on the basis of information derived from neuroimaging. The thought that we might be able to read minds by inspecting brains has stimulated philosophical interest for decades (Dennett 1978), but with recent advances in neuroimaging this idea has now passed from science fiction and into science: brainreading-or'brain decoding', as it is also known is now a burgeoning industry. ¹ Here are three examples of brainreading or at least attempted brainreading. In one study, Haynes and colleagues asked subjects to decide either to add or subtract two numbers that had been presented to them (Haynes et al. 2007; see also Haynes, this volume). On the basis of fMRI data, the experimenters were able to determine with up to 70% accuracy whether the subjects would sum the presented numbers or whether they would subtract one number from the other. In another study, Spence and colleagues suggested, on the basis of neuroimaging evidence, that a woman who had been convicted of intentionally inducing illness in a child may have been innocent (Spence et al. 2008). In a third study, Owen and colleagues concluded that a vegetative state patient was conscious on the grounds that she showed neural activity in brain areas implicated in motor imagery and spatial navigation when instructed to either imagine herself playing tennis or imagine herself visiting the rooms of her home (see also Boly et al. 2007; Monti/Vanhaudenhuyse et al. 2010). These studies are of great interest in their own right, but they also raise more general questions about the nature and scope of brain-based mindreading. One set of questions concerns the methodology of brainreading. How might one justify the ascription of a mental state to a creature on the basis of neuroimaging data? A second set of questions concerns the scope of brainreading. Under what conditions, and with respect to which kinds of mental states, might brainreading be possible? A third set of questions concerns