Vertical strategic interaction: Implications for channel pricing strategy
Vertical strategic interaction: Implications for channel pricing strategy
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DOI：
10.1287/mksc.16.3.185
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发表时间：
1997-01-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Staelin, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lee, E;Staelin, R
本文研究了渠道内的两种战略定价决策：使用前瞻性（即，价格领导）和考虑类别含义（即，产品线定价）。价格领先和产品线定价是否始终是渠道成员的最佳定价策略？如果没有，什么时候发生的，为什么？通过调查这些问题，我们解决了一些主要关注的营销从业者和学者感兴趣的渠道管理问题。此外，这项研究提供了一个深入的讨论，为什么以前的分析研究产生的答案，这些问题取决于需求函数的形式的选择。因此，这项研究应该显着解决分析营销模型之间的争论“正确”的需求specification.At我们讨论的核心是垂直战略互动的概念，这是定义在一个给定的需求结构内的渠道成员的反应，其渠道合作伙伴的行动的方向。具体来说，如果一个渠道成员的最佳反应是减少其利润率时，其渠道合作伙伴增加其利润率，垂直战略互动的类型被称为垂直战略替代性（VSS）。如果最好的反应是增加利润，这种环境被称为纵向战略互补（VSC）。如果最好的反应是不改变利润率，这被称为纵向战略独立（VSI）。运用博弈论的方法，我们证明了这三种类型的纵向战略相互作用的渠道价格领导和产品线pricing.Our调查的最优决策的关键驱动力包括两个制造商销售的竞争产品，都进行了两个竞争的零售商组成的行业模型的数学分析。因此，该模型允许零售商的产品线定价以及制造商和零售商的水平竞争。此外，这个通用模型可以用来分析三个更严格的行业设置经常发现在渠道文献，即，双边垄断（Jeuland和Shugan，1983），两个竞争的制造商通过竞争的特许零售商销售（McGuire和Staelin，1983），以及两个竞争的制造商通过一个共同的零售商使用产品线定价销售（Choi，1991）。与许多其他渠道研究不同，我们的大多数分析都是在不假设需求曲线的特定函数形式的情况下进行的。因此，这个付款人提供了更大的保证，从这个研究流的见解是广泛适用的，不仅在整个行业结构，而且在整个需求condition.The文件开始定义三种不同的规则如何定价：制造商使用前瞻性，零售商使用前瞻性，没有渠道成员使用前瞻性。然后，我们展示了一个一对一的映射类型之间的垂直战略互动和渠道价格领导的最优性。具体而言，渠道成员发现成为VSS的价格领导者是有利可图的，但更愿意成为VSC的追随者。对于VSI，渠道成员对渠道价格领导问题漠不关心，因为它对渠道成员的利润没有影响。我们还表明，存在的条件下，零售商可能会看到减少利润时，它改变了它的政策，从非产品线定价的产品线定价。当零售商不是价格领导者，并且环境的特征是VSS或VSC时，就会出现这种情况。在更一般的层面上，这项研究不仅表明了价值，而且还表明了企业使用上级知识的成本（即，前瞻性和/或产品线定价）在制定战略营销决策。因此，“无知是布利斯。我们还探讨了需求特征与三种类型的纵向战略互动之间的联系。我们发现，在给定的环境中，垂直战略互动的类型与需求曲线的凸性和给定价格的需求水平密切相关。有趣的是，我们认为需求的线性并不是三种纵向战略需求函数的必要条件。因此，在评估分析的鲁棒性，它可能是更重要的是，以确定类型的纵向战略相互作用，而不是假设的需求是线性或nonlinear.Finally，我们的研究结果仅限于情况下，渠道不协调和零售商的预先承诺特定的定价政策和决策是可信的。虽然这种情况仍然占据了现实的很大一部分，但我们承认，这项研究的见解可能并不适用于所有情况。
This paper examines two strategic pricing decisions within channels: using foresight (i.e., price leadership) and considering category implications (i.e., product line pricing). Are price leadership and product Line pricing always the best pricing strategies for a channel member? If not, when does this occur and why? By investigating these questions, we address some major concerns of both marketing practitioners and scholars interested in channel management issues. In addition, this study provides an indepth discussion on why previous analytic studies produced answers to these questions that depend upon the choice of the form of demand functions. As such, this study should significantly resolve the debate among analytic marketing modelers about the ''right'' demand specification.At the core of our discussion lies the concept of vertical strategic interaction, which is defined in terms of the direction of a channel member's reaction to the actions of its channel partner within a given demand structure. Specifically, if a channel member's best reaction is to reduce its margin when its channel partner increases its margin, the type of vertical strategic interaction is referred to as vertical strategic substitutability (VSS). If the best reaction is to increase the margin, the environment is referred to as vertical strategic complementarity (VSC). If the best reaction is no margin change, it is referred to as vertical strategic independence (VSI). Using a game theoretic approach, we demonstrate that these three types of vertical strategic interactions represent a key driving force for optimal decisions on channel price leadership and product line pricing.Our investigation involves mathematical analyses of an industry model composed of two manufacturers selling competing products, both carried by two competing retailers. As such, the model allows for retailer product Line pricing as well as manufacturer and retailer level competition. In addition, this general model can be used to analyze three more restrictive industry settings often found in the channels literature, i.e., a bilateral monopoly (Jeuland and Shugan 1983), two competing manufacturers selling through competing franchised retailers (McGuire and Staelin 1983), and two competing manufacturers selling through one common retailer using product line pricing (Choi 1991). Unlike many other channel studies, most of our analyses are performed without assuming particular functional forms of demand curves. Thus, this payer provides greater assurance that the insights from this stream of research are broadly applicable, not only across industry structures but also across demand conditions.The paper starts out by defining three different rules for how prices are set: The manufacturer uses foresight, the retailer uses foresight, and neither channel member uses foresight. We then show a one-to-one mapping between the type of vertical strategic interaction and the optimality of channel price leadership. Specifically, a channel member finds it profitable to be a price leader for VSS but prefers to be a follower for VSC. For VSI, channel members are indifferent to the channel price leadership issue, as it has no effect on channel member profits. We also show that there exist conditions under which a retailer might see a reduction in profits when it changes its policy from non-product line pricing to product line pricing. Such conditions arise when the retailer is not a price leader and the environment is characterized by VSS or VSC. At a more general level, this study suggests not only the value but also the cost to a firm for using superior knowledge (i.e., foresight and/or product line pricing) in making strategic marketing decisions. In this way, ''ignorance can be bliss.''We also explore the link between demand characteristics and the three types of vertical strategic interaction. We show that the type of vertical strategic interaction present in a given environment is closely related with the convexity of the demand curve and the level of demand for a given price. Interestingly, we End that linearity of demand is not a necessary condition for any of the three types of vertical strategic demand function. Consequently, in evaluating the robustness of analytic analyses, it may be more important to determine the type of vertical strategic interaction assumed instead of whether the demand is linear or nonlinear.Finally, our results are limited to situations where the channels are not coordinated and the retailer's precommitment to particular pricing policy and decision is credible. Although such situations still capture a significant portion of reality, we acknowledge that the insights from this study might not be applicable in all situations.