Corporate governance of controlling shareholders and labor employment decisions: Evidence from a parent board reform in China
Corporate governance of controlling shareholders and labor employment decisions: Evidence from a parent board reform in China
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控股股东的公司治理与劳动用工决策：来自中国母公司董事会改革的证据
DOI：
10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105753
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发表时间：
2022
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Hao Gao
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Rui Fan;Jianping Pan;Minggui Yu;Hao Gao
在股权集中的国有企业中，控股股东侵占少数股东的现象十分普遍。为了遏制这种行为，研究主要集中在公司内部治理结构的作用，而在很大程度上忽略了与控股股东有关的治理结构。我们利用2003年至2019年间改变中国中央国有企业控股股东治理的董事会改革，表明加强控股股东的公司治理可以显着减少企业对员工的过度投资。我们证明，加强对管理层的监控是这种关联最有可能的潜在渠道。研究结果表明，控股股东治理结构的改善可以缓解国有企业人力资本配置的不当，这表明改革控股股东治理结构可以有效提高国有企业效率。
Controlling shareholders commonly expropriate minority shareholders in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with concentrated ownership. To curb such behavior, studies have focused on the role of internal corporate governance structures and largely ignored the governance structure in relation to the controlling shareholders. Using a board reform that altered the governance of controlling shareholders in Chinese central SOEs between 2003 and 2019, we show that enhancing the controlling shareholders' corporate governance significantly reduces firms’ overinvestment in employees. We demonstrate that strengthening the monitoring of management is the most likely underlying channel for this association. Our findings indicate that governance enhancement of controlling shareholders mitigates human capital misallocation in SOEs, suggesting that reforming the governance structure of controlling shareholders is effective in enhancing SOE efficiency.