Anger at unfairness: Is it moral outrage?
Anger at unfairness: Is it moral outrage?
复制标题
DOI：
10.1002/ejsp.434
复制
发表时间：
2007-11-01
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Zerger, Tricia
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Batson, C. Daniel;Kennedy, Christopher L.;Zerger, Tricia
对不公平待遇的愤怒被称为道德愤慨。然而，道德愤怒--对违反道德标准的愤怒--应该与个人对受到伤害的愤怒以及看到自己关心的另一个人受到伤害时的同理心愤怒区分开来。通过一个初步实验和一个主要实验，我们发现了个人愤怒和移情愤怒的证据，但几乎没有道德愤怒的证据。这两个实验都是为了操纵这三种愤怒的评估条件。参与者感受到了对另一个人的不公平对待，甚至另一个他们没有被诱导产生共鸣的人，就像参与者感受到自己受到的不公平对待一样不公平。但引发愤怒的评估条件是对自己的不公平对待和对被照顾者的不公平对待，而不是本身的不公平。在缺乏移情关怀的情况下，对另一个人的不公平对待几乎不会引起愤怒，这可能会对理解道德情绪和道德动机产生影响。版权所有(C)2007 John Wiley&Sons，Ltd.
Anger at unfair treatment has been called moral outrage. However moral outrage-anger at the violation of a moral standard-should be distinguished from personal anger at being harmed and empathic anger at seeing another for whom one cares harmed. Across a preliminary experiment and a main experiment, both designed to manipulate the appraisal conditions for these three forms of anger we found evidence of personal anger and empathic anger, but little evidence of moral outrage. Participants perceived unfair treatment of another even another for whom they had not been induced to feel empathy, to be as unfair as participants perceived unfair treatment of themselves. But the appraisal conditions that evoked anger were unfair treatment of self and unfair treatment of a cared-for other not unfairness per se. In the absence of empathic concern, unfair treatment of another evoked little anger Possible implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are suggested. Copyright (C) 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.