A behavioral model of clinician responses to incentives to improve quality
A behavioral model of clinician responses to incentives to improve quality
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DOI：
10.1016/j.healthpol.2006.03.001
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发表时间：
2007-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.3
通讯作者：
Dudley, R. Adams
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Frolich, Anne;Talavera, Jason A.;Dudley, R. Adams
绩效工资（P4P）和公共绩效报告（PR）在医疗保健领域的使用正在全球范围内迅速增加。P4P和PR的理论基础来自于其他行业的经验，以及心理学、经济学和组织行为学中关于激励使用的理论。本文回顾了这项先前研究的主要主题，并考虑如何将其应用于医疗保健。由此产生的概念模型解决了许多政策制定者正在推行的举措的双重性质（结合直接的财务和声誉激励）。它还包括明确认识到关键的背景因素（在市场和供应商组织的水平）和供应商和患者的特点，可以增强或减轻对激励措施的反应。评估现有的文献（截至2005年6月）在医疗保健中的激励使用的概念模型，突出了重要的弱点的方式，试验已报告到目前为止，并建议未来的研究课题。(c)2006爱思唯尔爱尔兰有限公司保留所有权利。
The use of pay for performance (P4P) and public reporting of performance (PR) in health care is increasing rapidly worldwide. The rationale for P4P and PR comes from experience in other industries and from theories about incentive use from psychology, economics, and organizational behavior. This paper reviews the major themes from this prior research and considers how they might be applied to health care. The resulting conceptual model addresses the dual nature (combining direct financial and reputational incentives) of the initiatives many policymakers are pursuing. It also includes explicit recognition of the key contextual factors (at the levels of the markets and the provider organization) and provider and patient characteristics that can enhance or mitigate response to incentives. Evaluation of the existing literature (through June 2005) about incentive use in health care in light of the conceptual model highlights important weaknesses in the way that trials have been reported to date and suggests future research topics. (c) 2006 Elsevier Ireland Ltd. All rights reserved.