Framing effects and rationality
Framing effects and rationality
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框架效应与合理性
DOI：
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199216093.003.0004
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
R. Craig
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. A. McKenzie;R. Craig
实验心理学的大多数研究旨在构建人类认知能力的良好模型。然而，一些重要的工作并不是主要致力于寻找认知的描述性模型。这项研究的目的，而不是测试的认知和行为模型的一个特殊类别的经验适合，被认为是有趣的，在自己的权利，所谓的“理性演员”或“理性选择”的模型（沙菲尔和LeBoeuf，2002年）。即使心理学家一致反对这些基于经验的模型（大多数人都是这样），许多人仍然会寻求研究它们的经验分歧和拟合模式。这是因为理性行动者模型具有明显的实践和哲学意义，以及它们在社会科学中不可否认的突出地位。进一步的研究，在本卷中有充分的记录，试图融合经验和规范研究，互动地建模理性行动者和人类行动者。这一传统对经典的理性行动者模型本身并不感兴趣;相反，它假设通过仔细观察人类行为可以发展出更好的规范模型，并且可以借助合适的规范模型来实现对人类行为的更深入理解。这第三种传统中的一些研究者对人类心理过程的最优性做出了明确的工作假设。其他人（包括本书作者）也有这样的基本直觉：规范分析和经验分析通常会相互提供有价值的启示，尽管有时是以微妙的方式。尽管如此，经典理性行动者模型的经验拟合这个简单问题仍然是实验心理学几个研究领域的核心问题。本章考察的就是这样一个领域：对判断和选择中框架效应的研究。理性模型的实证检验会遇到两类问题。第一类是所有心理学实验研究的共同挫折：有必要对受试者可获得的信息进行彻底的说明，尽管通常非常困难。如果实验输入的表征不完整，观察到的输出会严重误导分析师。人类认知
Most research in experimental psychology aims to construct good models of human cognitive faculties. Some important work, however, is not principally invested in the search for descriptive models of cognition. This research aims instead to test the empirical fit of a special class of cognitive and behavioral models, deemed interesting in their own right—the so-called ‘rational actor’or ‘rational choice’models (Shafir & LeBoeuf, 2002). Even if psychologists unanimously rejected these models on empirical grounds (as most do), many would still seek to study their patterns of empirical divergence and fit. This is because of the apparent practical and philosophical significance of rational actor models, as well as their undeniable prominence in the social sciences.A further strand of research, amply documented in the present volume, attempts to fuse empirical and normative studies, modeling rational actors and human actors interactively. This tradition is not interested in the classical rational actor models per se; it supposes, instead, that better normative models can be developed by looking closely at human behavior, and that a deeper understanding of human behavior can be achieved with the aid of suitable normative models. Some investigators in this third tradition make explicit working assumptions about the optimality of human psychological processes. Others (the present authors among them) share the basic intuition that normative and empirical analyses commonly shed valuable light on one another, albeit in sometimes subtle ways. Still, the simple question of the empirical fit of the classical rational actor models is the central concern in several research areas in experimental psychology. This chapter examines one such area: the study of framing effects in judgment and choice. Empirical tests of rational models run into two classes of problems. The first class is the common frustration of all experimental research in psychology: it is necessary, though often maddeningly difficult, to keep a thorough accounting of the information that is available to the subject. If the characterization of experimental inputs is incomplete, the observed outputs can severely mislead the analyst. Human cognition