Is Little Red Riding Hood afraid of her grandmother? Cognitive vs. emotional response to a false belief
Is Little Red Riding Hood afraid of her grandmother? Cognitive vs. emotional response to a false belief
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DOI：
10.1348/026151099165438
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发表时间：
1999-11-01
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Schneider, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bradmetz, J;Schneider, R
心理理论的基本要素通常被认为是在4岁左右，即儿童在标准的“Maxi任务”中取得成功时获得的(Wimmer&Perner，1983)。然而，在认知发展的其他领域，理性思维在7-8岁之前是不会获得的。这项研究表明，在7-8岁之前，当一个信念的几个评估需要协调时，使用逻辑标准来掌握心理状态归因是不可能的。错误信念的认知和情感评估之间的分离揭示了这一点，这种错误信念在大多数在标准木桶上取得成功的儿童中产生了相互矛盾的反应。这一结果在五个实验中得到了重复，共有254名3-8岁的儿童参加。本文分析的重点是情绪归因的自主性，以及标准木桶中所隐含的信念理解的半心理和半行为结构。处理能力的增加导致了大约7-8岁的理性信念概念：这个概念在这里被称为“第三人称”，与“第二人称”相反，后者只涉及从第一人称的角度进行初步区分。第二人称依赖于自我和他人之间的对立，对信念进行单一的、模块化的评估，而第三人称依赖于各种评估的整合，并提供了一致和各向同性的信念概念。
The essentials of a theory of mind are generally considered to be acquired around 4 years of age when the child succeeds in the standard 'Maxi task' (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, rational thought is not attained before 7-8 years of age in other domains of cognitive development. This study demonstrates that the mastery of mental state attribution using logical criteria is not reached before age 7-8 years when several assessments of a belief need to be coordinated. This is revealed by the dissociation between the cognitive and emotional assessments of a false belief which yield contradictory responses in most of the children who succeed on the standard cask. The results were replicated in five experiments with a total of 254 children aged 3-8 years. The analysis of this decalage focuses on the autonomy of emotional attributions and the semi-mental and semi-behavioural structure of belief understanding implied in the standard cask. An increase in processing capacity leads to a rational concept of belief around 7-8 years: this concept is called here 'third-person', in opposition to 'second-person' which involves only an initial differentiation from the first-person point of view. Second-person depends on an opposition between che self and che other in terms of a single, modular evaluation of belief, whereas third-person depends on an integration among various assessments and provides a consistent and isotropic concept of belief.