Game-Theoretic Security for Bit Commitment
Game-Theoretic Security for Bit Commitment
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-41383-4_20
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发表时间：
2013-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Haruna Higo;Keisuke Tanaka;Kenji Yasunaga
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Haruna Higo;Keisuke Tanaka;Kenji Yasunaga
Higo，Tanaka，Yamada和Yasunaga(ACISP2012)从博弈论的角度研究了恶意模型中的不经意转移(OT)。他们的工作可以被视为ASharov，Canetti和Hazay(Eurocrypt 2011)对失败-停止模型中两方计算的研究的扩展。本文主要研究比特承诺，并从博弈论的角度继续研究它。与OT的工作类似，我们考虑了恶意模型中的BIT承诺。为了自然地捕获BIT承诺的安全属性，我们用双方都是理性的单一博弈来描述它们。特别地，我们从博弈论的角度定义了安全概念，并证明了它与标准安全概念的等价性。
Higo, Tanaka, Yamada, and Yasunaga (ACISP 2012) studied oblivious transfer (OT) from a game-theoretic viewpoint in the malicious model. Their work can be considered as an extension of the study on two-party computation in the fail-stop model by Asharov, Canetti, and Hazay (EUROCRYPT 2011).This paper focuses on bit commitment, and continues to study it from a perspective of game theory. In a similar manner to the work on OT, we consider bit commitment in the malicious model. In order to naturally capture the security properties of bit commitment, we characterize them with a single game where both parties are rational. In particular, we define a security notion from a game theoretic viewpoint, and prove the equivalence between it and the standard security notion.