A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886
A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886
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卡特尔稳定性研究：联合执行委员会，1880-1886 年
DOI：
10.1017/cbo9780511528231.024
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发表时间：
1983
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Porter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Porter
本文采用了1880 ~ 1886年联合执行委员会铁路卡特尔的每周时间序列数据，实证检验了观察到的价格反映了从合谋行为到非合作行为的转变这一命题。一个具有非对称厂商的动态寡占均衡模型，连同关于成本和需求的显函数形式假设，确定了计量经济模型的估计方程和随机结构。假设没有发生转换，使价格和数量的变动完全归因于外生的需求和成本函数的变化，然后测试对这个替代品和拒绝。
This article employs weekly time series data on the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior. An equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms, together with explicit functional form assumptions about costs and demand, determines the estimating equations and stochastic structure of the econometric model. The hypothesis that no switch took place, so that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in the demand and cost functions, is then tested against this alternative and rejected.