Employee Buyout in a Bargaining Game with Asymmetric Information
Employee Buyout in a Bargaining Game with Asymmetric Information
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信息不对称的讨价还价博弈中的员工买断
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
B. Jun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Avner Ben;B. Jun
为什么有些公司会被员工收购？本文从理论上探讨了这一问题，认为员工可能会试图克服他们的信息障碍，对公司的盈利能力，同时提供工资和购买价格的公司。相对不盈利的公司的所有者倾向于以低价出售，而不是支付高工资，而盈利公司的所有者则宁愿支付高工资，也不愿接受低公司价格;收购是一种筛选机制。员工买断的可能性随着员工的外部期权而减少，随着所有者的外部期权而增加。版权所有1996年美国经济协会。
Why are some firms purchased by their employees? This paper explores this question theoretically, suggesting that employees may attempt to overcome their informational handicap regarding firm profitability by making simultaneous offers on wages and a purchase price for the firm. Owners of relatively unprofitable firms will tend to sell out for low prices instead of paying high wages, whereas owners of profitable firms will prefer to pay high wages over receiving low firm prices; the buyout serves as a screening mechanism. The probability of an employee buyout decreases with the employees' outside options and increases with owners' outside options. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.