Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design
Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design
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促进内战后和平：承诺问题和协议设计
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00554.x
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发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
B. Savun
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Michaela Mattes;B. Savun
内战后的持久和平很难建立。确保持久和平的一个有希望的办法是仔细设计内战解决办法。我们使用单一的理论模型来整合有关内战协议设计的现有工作，并确定应该特别成功地实现持久和平的其他协议条款。我们利用战争的讨价还价模型，指出承诺问题作为内战的中心解释。我们认为，两种类型的规定应减轻承诺的问题：减少恐惧和增加成本的规定。第三方保证和分享权力等减少恐惧的规定减轻了交战方对另一方机会主义的担忧。部队隔离等规定增加了进一步战斗的代价，因而不希望恢复敌对行动。使用新扩大的数据内战协议之间的1945年和2005年，我们证明，成本增加的规定确实减少了内战复发的机会。我们还认为，分享政治权力是最有希望减少恐惧的规定。
Lasting peace after civil war is difficult to establish. One promising way to ensure durable peace is by carefully designing civil war settlements. We use a single theoretical model to integrate existing work on civil war agreement design and to identify additional agreement provisions that should be particularly successful at bringing about enduring peace. We make use of the bargaining model of war which points to commitment problems as a central explanation for civil war. We argue that two types of provisions should mitigate commitment problems: fear-reducing and cost-increasing provisions. Fear-reducing provisions such as third-party guarantees and power-sharing alleviate the belligerents’ concerns about opportunism by the other side. Provisions such as the separation of forces make the resumption of hostilities undesirable by increasing the costs of further fighting. Using newly expanded data on civil war agreements between 1945 and 2005, we demonstrate that cost-increasing provisions indeed reduce the chance of civil war recurrence. We also identify political power-sharing as the most promising fear-reducing provision.