Social learning in cooperative dilemmas
Social learning in cooperative dilemmas
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DOI：
10.1098/rspb.2014.0417
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发表时间：
2014-07
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Shakti Lamba
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shakti Lamba
帮助是社会组织的基石，在人类社会中司空见惯。进化科学面临的一个主要挑战是解释在具有高迁移率的大种群中如何保持合作，在这种情况下，合作者可能被自私的个体利用。文化群体选择模型认为，这种大规模的合作是通过选择作用于群体而演变的，群体之间的行为变异是通过合作规范的文化传播来维持的。这些模型假设个体通过社会学习获得合作策略。这一假设尚未得到实证检验。在这里，我测试这一点，通过调查是否个人采用因循守旧或支付偏见的学习在公共产品的游戏进行了14个村庄的一个觅食园艺社会，印度的Pahari Korwa。个人没有表现出明显的趋势，以符合或回报偏见，是高度可变的，在他们使用的社会学习。这种差异部分是由于个人和村庄的特点。随着模态贡献值的增加，一致性的趋势减小，收益偏向的趋势增加。这些研究结果表明，在合作困境中使用社会学习是视情况而定的个人的情况和环境，并质疑存在稳定传输的文化规范的合作。
Helping is a cornerstone of social organization and commonplace in human societies. A major challenge for the evolutionary sciences is to explain how cooperation is maintained in large populations with high levels of migration, conditions under which cooperators can be exploited by selfish individuals. Cultural group selection models posit that such large-scale cooperation evolves via selection acting on populations among which behavioural variation is maintained by the cultural transmission of cooperative norms. These models assume that individuals acquire cooperative strategies via social learning. This assumption remains empirically untested. Here, I test this by investigating whether individuals employ conformist or payoff-biased learning in public goods games conducted in 14 villages of a forager–horticulturist society, the Pahari Korwa of India. Individuals did not show a clear tendency to conform or to be payoff-biased and are highly variable in their use of social learning. This variation is partly explained by both individual and village characteristics. The tendency to conform decreases and to be payoff-biased increases as the value of the modal contribution increases. These findings suggest that the use of social learning in cooperative dilemmas is contingent on individuals' circumstances and environments, and question the existence of stably transmitted cultural norms of cooperation.