Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency
Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency
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耐用品、垄断维护和时间不一致
DOI：
10.1111/j.1530-9134.2004.00011.x
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Michael Waldman
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Morita;Michael Waldman
耐用品生产商经常选择垄断自己产品的维修市场。这篇论文表明，与租赁类似，公司可能采用这种做法的一个原因是它减少甚至消除了由于时间不一致而产生的问题。我们首先在一个与Bulow(1982)对耐用品垄断的经典分析密切相关的背景下证明了这一结果。然后，我们在类似于Waldman(1996,1997)和Hendel and Lizzeri(1999)中考虑的情况下展示了结果，在这种情况下，新的和使用的单位是不完美的替代品。文章还讨论了对这一现象的其他解释。版权所有：美国马萨诸塞州02148,350Main Street，350Main Street，以及英国牛津OX42DQ加辛顿路9600号。
Durable-goods producers frequently choose to monopolize the maintenance markets for their own products. This paper shows that, similar to leasing, one reason a firm may employ this practice is that it reduces or even eliminates problems due to time inconsistency. We first demonstrate this result in a setting closely related to Bulow's (1982) classic analysis of durable-goods monopoly. We then show the result in a setting similar to those considered in Waldman (1996, 1997) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999), in which new and used units are imperfect substitutes. The paper also discusses alternative explanations for the phenomenon. Copyright 2004 Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK..