Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Environmental Protection with Unilateral Tariff Reduction
Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Environmental Protection with Unilateral Tariff Reduction
复制标题
单边降税的内生游说形成和内生环境保护
DOI：
10.1007/s10640-013-9658-7
复制
发表时间：
2014
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
Shinya Kawahara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Shinya Kawahara;Shinya Kawahara
本文研究一个国家的贸易自由化决定如何影响决定另一个国家环境政策的政治经济结构。通过构建一个游说团体的形成和环境政策是内生决定的政治经济学模型，我们表明，一个进口污染产品的大国单方面降低关税，将在一个出口该产品的小国产生一个组织成本相对较低的游说团体。一个制定好的游说要求一个低效的环境政策，因此，小国的环境法规变得低效。然后，我们表明，当游说集团已经存在时，单方面的关税削减会导致竞争游说集团的形成，从而使小国的环境政策更有效。
This paper studies how one country’s decision to liberalize trade affects the political economic structure that determines environmental policy in another country. By constructing a political economy model in which the formation of lobby groups and environmental policy are endogenously determined, we show that unilateral tariff reductions by a large country importing a polluting good will generate a lobby group with a relatively lower cost of organization in a small country exporting that good. A formulated lobby demands an inefficient environmental policy, and hence, the small country’s environmental regulations become less efficient. Then, we show that when a lobby already exists, unilateral tariff reductions result in the formation of a rival lobby and consequently make the small country’s environmental policy more efficient.