New paradigm psychology of reasoning
New paradigm psychology of reasoning
复制标题
推理心理学新范式
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Over
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Over
Oaksford和Chater（O&C）写了一本很有意思的书，这本书推进了推理心理学的新范式。正如他们的标题所暗示的那样，他们是贝叶斯主义者，并且看到了推理和概率判断之间的本质联系。他们攻击了理性就是遵循逻辑规则的说法，并主张贝叶斯概率论是人类推理的正确规范和计算理论。逻辑在纯数学中得到了正确的应用，但普通人无法逃避不确定性。为什么人们会简单地假设他们买彩票就能赢得一大笔钱呢？通过做出这个假设，然后买一张彩票，他们可以有效地推断他们将赢得财富。但是，这个推论对于理性的信念和关于彩票和购买彩票的决策是无用的。从这个角度来看，O&C提出了条件推理，沃森的选择任务（包括指示和道义）和三段论推理的新理论。O&C的书已经在行为和脑科学中得到了广泛的评论，他们在回复评论时扩展和修改了他们的建议（Oaksford & Chater，2009 a，2009 b）。我不想在此重复这些评论中已充分阐述的观点。但我认为，O&C方法的基本方面尚未得到足够的重视。这些是贝叶斯理性与逻辑的关系，以及根据贝叶斯条件概率的中心概念分析条件推理。介绍这些主题以及解释O&C对新范式的贡献的最好方式是描述O&C称之为“逻辑主义者”的旧范式。我认为他们对“逻辑主义者”的使用是误导性的，他们更喜欢用“二元范式”代替旧范式。采用二元范式的最好例子是Johnson-Laird and Byrne（1991）。在他们的心智模型理论中，每一个命题都只是思维与推理，2009，15（4），431-438
Oaksford and Chater (O&C) have written a book of great interest, which has advanced the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning. As their title implies, they are Bayesians and see an essential connection between reasoning and probability judgement. They attack the claim that rationality is about following the rules of logic, and argue for Bayesian probability theory as the correct normative and computation theory of human reasoning. Logic is correctly used in pure mathematics, but ordinary human beings cannot escape uncertainty. Why would people simply assume that they win a fortune if they buy a lottery ticket? By making this assumption, and then buying a ticket, they can validly infer that they will win the fortune. But that inference is useless for a rational belief and decision making about the lottery and buying a ticket. From this perspective, O&C propose new theories of conditional reasoning, Wason’s selection task (both indicative and deontic), and syllogistic inference. O&C’s book has already been extensively reviewed in Behavioral and Brain Sciences, and they have extended andmodified their proposals in replies to the commentaries (Oaksford & Chater, 2009a, 2009b). I will not repeat here reviewing points that have been covered adequately in those commentaries. But I believe that fundamental aspects of O&C’s approach have not yet had sufficient attention. These are the relation between Bayesian rationality and logic, and the analysis of conditional reasoning in termsof the centralBayesian concept of conditional probability. The bestway to introduce these topics, and explain O&C’s contribution to the new paradigm, is by describing the old ‘‘logicist’’ paradigm, as O&C call it. I will argue that their use of ‘‘logicist’’ is misleading and prefer ‘‘binary paradigm’’ for the old one. The best example of a book in the binary paradigm is Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991). In their mental model theory, every proposition is only THINKING & REASONING, 2009, 15 (4), 431–438