Incentive Strategy Considering Observation Period to Manage Supply Disruption under Uncertain Demand
Incentive Strategy Considering Observation Period to Manage Supply Disruption under Uncertain Demand
复制标题
DOI：
10.1109/ieem55944.2022.9989776
复制
发表时间：
2022-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Lingzi Li;Shuangshuang Dong;Meimei Zheng;W. Weng
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lingzi Li;Shuangshuang Dong;Meimei Zheng;W. Weng
研究了需求不确定情况下从不可靠供应商采购的最优订货问题。供应商受到随机中断的影响。如果在观察期内出现供应中断，买方将主动投入固定的安装成本，并调整单位批发价格，以激励供应商恢复生产，完成正常订单。否则，买方不采取任何风险处理措施。导出了买方最优订货决策。研究发现，激励策略并不总是有利的，并给出了激励策略有效的条件。数值实验结果表明，当中断概率适中或需求变异性较低时，激励策略的价值更为显著。
This paper studies the optimal ordering problem of a buyer who sources from an unreliable supplier under uncertain demand. The supplier is subject to a random disruption. If the supply disruption occurs during the observation period, the buyer will proactively invest a fixed setup cost and adjust the unit wholesale price to incentivize the supplier to restore production and fulfill the regular order. Otherwise, the buyer does not adopt any risk handling measurements. We derive the buyer’s optimal ordering decision. It is found that the incentive strategy is not always profitable, and the conditions where the incentive strategy is useful are provided. The results of numerical experiments indicate that the value of incentive strategy is more significant when the disruption probability is moderate, or the demand variability is low.