COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MATCHING MODELS WITH FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MATCHING MODELS WITH FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
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匹配模型与财务约束的竞争均衡
DOI：
10.1111/iere.12550
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Zhou Yu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Herings P. Jean‐Jacques;Zhou Yu
我们考虑一个匹配的合同模型中，买家面临的财务约束。在这个模型中，竞争均衡可能不存在。因此，我们提出了数量约束竞争均衡（QCCE）的新概念。在QCCE中，买家对交易的预期供应形成预期。如果相应的资金限制具有约束力，买方可能预期不会提供交易。我们通过一个动态的过程，更新价格和数量约束，QCCE的结果和稳定的结果之间的等价性，以及一些其他性质的QCCE的晶格属性，我们显示QCCE的存在。
We consider a matching with contracts model in which buyers face financial constraints. In this model, a competitive equilibrium may fail to exist. We therefore propose the new notion of quantity‐constrained competitive equilibrium (QCCE). At a QCCE, buyers form expectations about the expected supply of trades. A buyer may expect that a trade is not to be supplied if the corresponding financial constraint is binding. We show the existence of QCCEs via a dynamic process that updates prices and quantity constraints, the equivalence between QCCE outcomes and stable outcomes, and some other properties of QCCEs like the lattice property.