A Passivity Framework for Modeling and Mitigating Wormhole Attacks on Networked Control Systems
A Passivity Framework for Modeling and Mitigating Wormhole Attacks on Networked Control Systems
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DOI：
10.1109/tac.2014.2351871
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发表时间：
2013-12
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Phillip Lee;Andrew Clark;L. Bushnell;R. Poovendran
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Phillip Lee;Andrew Clark;L. Bushnell;R. Poovendran
网络控制系统由分布式传感器和执行器组成，通过无线网络进行通信。使用开放式无线介质和无人值守部署使这些系统容易受到旨在破坏系统性能的智能攻击者的攻击。本文研究了对网络控制系统的虫洞攻击，在该攻击中，敌方通过使用高增益天线(如带外虫洞)或共谋网络节点(如带内虫洞)在两个地理上相距较远的网络区域之间建立链路。虫洞允许攻击者通过首先创建吸引网络流量的低延迟链路，然后延迟或丢弃分组来违反实时控制系统的时间限制。由于虫洞攻击会重新路由和重播有效消息，因此仅使用加密机制无法检测到它。我们研究了虫洞攻击对网络流量和时延的影响，并引入了一个基于被动性的控制理论框架来建模和缓解虫洞攻击。我们为带内和带外虫洞攻击以及由带内和带外虫洞的任意组合组成的复杂的、迄今未报道的虫洞攻击开发了该框架。通过将现有的缓解策略集成到我们的框架中，我们分析了整个系统的吞吐量、延迟和稳定性属性。通过仿真研究表明，通过选择性地丢弃控制包，虫洞攻击可以在网络控制系统的物理对象中引起扰动，并且适当地选择检测参数可以在满足物理系统的时延约束的情况下缓解由于虫洞引起的扰动。
Networked control systems consist of distributed sensors and actuators that communicate via a wireless network. The use of an open wireless medium and unattended deployment leaves these systems vulnerable to intelligent adversaries whose goal is to disrupt the system performance. In this paper, we study the wormhole attack on a networked control system, in which an adversary establishes a link between two geographically distant regions of the network by using either high-gain antennas, as in the out-of-band wormhole, or colluding network nodes as in the in-band wormhole. Wormholes allow the adversary to violate the timing constraints of real-time control systems by first creating low-latency links, which attract network traffic, and then delaying or dropping packets. Since the wormhole attack reroutes and replays valid messages, it cannot be detected using cryptographic mechanisms alone. We study the impact of the wormhole attack on the network flows and delays and introduce a passivity-based control-theoretic framework for modeling and mitigating the wormhole attack. We develop this framework for both the in-band and out-of-band wormhole attacks as well as complex, hereto-unreported wormhole attacks consisting of arbitrary combinations of in-and out-of band wormholes. By integrating existing mitigation strategies into our framework, we analyze the throughput, delay, and stability properties of the overall system. Through simulation study, we show that, by selectively dropping control packets, the wormhole attack can cause disturbances in the physical plant of a networked control system, and demonstrate that appropriate selection of detection parameters mitigates the disturbances due to the wormhole while satisfying the delay constraints of the physical system.