Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1308730
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发表时间：
2008-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Atila Abdulkadiroglu;Yeon-Koo Che;Yosuke Yasuda
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文献类型：
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作者：
Atila Abdulkadiroglu;Yeon-Koo Che;Yosuke Yasuda
在学校选择计划的设计中，真实地揭示偏好已经成为一个迫切需要的问题。Gale-Shapley的延迟接受机制对学生来说是防策略的，但限制了他们传达偏好强度的能力。当学校偏好的联系被随机打破时，这导致了事前的低效率。我们提出了一种延迟接受机制的变体，它允许学生影响他们在关系中的待遇。它保持了顺序偏好的真实揭示，并支持更大范围的效率。
Truthful revelation of preferences has emerged as a desideratum in the design of school choice programs. Gale-Shapley's deferred acceptance mechanism is strategy-proof for students but limits their ability to communicate their preference intensities. This results in ex-ante inefficiency when ties at school preferences are broken randomly. We propose a variant of deferred acceptance mechanism which allows students to influence how they are treated in ties. It maintains truthful revelation of ordinal preferences and supports a greater scope of efficiency.