Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
复制标题
投标人具有任意类型时拍卖的收入比较
DOI：
10.7916/d8qr58bt
复制
发表时间：
2006
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Ian L. Gale
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yeon;Ian L. Gale
当投标人的类型来自任意分布时，本文发展了一种描述拍卖预期收入的方法。具体地说，类型可以是多维的，并且在分布中可能存在质量点。一个应用程序扩展了现有的收入等价性结果。另一个应用表明，当投标人规避风险并面临财务限制时，第一价格拍卖比第二价格拍卖产生更高的预期收入。这一收入排名扩展到具有一般形式的非预期效用偏好的风险厌恶投标者。
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders’ types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and facefinancial constraints. This revenue ranking extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of nonexpected utility preferences.