Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting
Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting
复制标题
信息不对称和同时投票与顺序投票
DOI：
10.2307/2585760
复制
发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Kenneth C. Williams
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Morton;Kenneth C. Williams
当一些选民在同一次选举中知道先前的决定时，就会发生顺序投票。从历史上看，美国总统初选的投票是顺序进行的，但最近的初选已经“提前”到了赛季的前几周。我们探讨了顺序投票在拖延的初选和同时投票在前加载的理论和使用实验室选举来检验我们的预测经验。我们发现的证据表明，在顺序投票后，选民可以使用早期的结果来推断候选人的信息，并作出选择，更好地反映他们的喜好。后来的选民推断信息的能力随着风险规避水平的提高和早期结果的信息提供而增加。我们发现，当一个温和的候选人在很大程度上是未知的，在顺序投票的信息聚合可以增加的概率S/他会赢，这支持了政策制定者的论点，顺序投票可以导致不同的选举结果。
Sequential voting takes place when some voters make choices with knowledge of earlier decisions in the same election. Historically, voting in U.S. presidential primaries is sequential, but recent primaries have been “front-loaded” into the early weeks of the season. We explore sequential voting in drawn-out primaries and simultaneous voting in front-loaded ones theoretically and use laboratory elections to examine our predictions empirically. We find evidence that in sequential voting later voters can use early outcomes to infer information about candidates and make choices that better reflect their preferences. The ability of later voters to infer information increases with higher levels of risk aversion and information provided on early outcomes. We discover that when a moderate candidate is largely unknown, information aggregation in sequential voting can increase the probability s/he will win, which supports the contention of policymakers that sequential voting can lead to different electoral outcomes.