Are Qualified and Experienced Outside Directors Willing to Join Fraudulent Firms and If So, Why?
Are Qualified and Experienced Outside Directors Willing to Join Fraudulent Firms and If So, Why?
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DOI：
10.2308/accr-52195
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发表时间：
2018-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Samir Ghannam;M. Bugeja;Z. Matolcsy;Helen Spiropoulos
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Samir Ghannam;M. Bugeja;Z. Matolcsy;Helen Spiropoulos
我们调查是否有资格和经验丰富的董事愿意加入公司后，财务舞弊的启示。具体而言，我们专注于具有董事会经验的董事以及会计和法律的专家。我们发现，尽管欺诈公司的声誉受损，工作量增加，但合格和经验丰富的董事加入了这些公司的董事会。在加入欺诈性公司之后，董事们将获得额外的董事会席位，并从更高的薪酬中获益。我们排除了其他解释，并通过进行各种测试，包括倾向得分匹配和差异中的差异分析，验证结果的稳健性。JEL分类：G30; G34。
We investigate whether qualified and experienced directors are willing to join firms following the revelation of financial fraud. Specifically, we focus on directors with prior board experience and accounting and legal experts. We find that, notwithstanding the tarnished reputation of fraudulent firms and a higher workload, qualified and experienced directors join the boards of such firms. Subsequent to joining fraudulent firms, directors are rewarded with additional future board seats and benefit from higher compensation. We rule out alternative explanations and verify the robustness of the results by performing a variety of tests, including propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analysis. JEL Classifications: G30; G34.