Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers
Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers
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联邦制和公司法：保护经理人免受收购的竞赛
DOI：
10.2307/1123454
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发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
Allen Ferrell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
L. Bebchuk;Allen Ferrell
本文分析了公司法中国家竞争的若干重要缺陷。特别是，我们表明，在收购方面，国家有动机制定规则，过度保护现任管理人员。我们认为，国家接管法的发展与我们的理论是一致的。各州通过的反收购法规几乎没有什么政策基础，更重要的是，它们为管理者提供了更广泛、更开放的自由，让他们可以采取防御性策略，即使是最赞成这种策略的评论家也不赞同。此外，尽管各州本可以采取其他措施，但它们还是选择对似乎不支持它们的股东实施反收购保护，这让股东几乎没有选择或发言权。最后，我们最后指出，国家竞争的支持者不能调和他们的观点与国家收购法的演变，因此，应该重新考虑他们的国家竞争的无条件支持。
This paper analyzes certain important shortcomings of state competition in corporate law. In particular, we show that, with respect to takeovers, states have incentives to produce rules that excessively protect incumbent managers. The development of state takeover law, we argue, is consistent with our theory. States have adopted antitakeover statutes that have little policy basis, and, more importantly, they have provided managers with a wider and more open-ended latitude to engage in defensive tactics than endorsed even by the commentators most favorable to such tactics. Furthermore, states have elected, even though they could have done otherwise, to impose antitakeover protections on shareholders, who did not appear to favor them, in a way that left shareholders with little choice or say. Finally, we conclude by pointing out that proponents of state competition cannot reconcile their views with the evolution of state takeover law--and should, therefore, reconsider their unqualified support of state competition.