A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism
A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism
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DOI：
10.2307/1956010
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发表时间：
1983-03
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
T. Sandler;J. Tschirhart;Jon Cauley
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Sandler;J. Tschirhart;Jon Cauley
本文提出了一些“理性行动者”模型，描述了恐怖分子和政府决策者之间的谈判过程中，人质或财产被扣押，并发出要求的事件。这些模型说明了恐怖分子和决策者的目标和面临的限制。通过概率约束引入不确定性（即，机会约束），要求某些事件发生的特定可能性。随着模型参数的变化，从比较静态分析中提取了相应的含义。文章的最后一部分提出了一个俱乐部理论分析跨国突击队的共享。
This article presents some “rational-actor” models that depict the negotiation process between terrorists and government policymakers for those incidents where hostages or property are seized and demands are issued. The models account for the objectives and constraints faced by both the terrorists and the policymakers. Uncertainty is introduced through probability constraints (i.e., chance constraints) requiring a specific likelihood of some event occurring. Implications are subsequently extracted from the comparative static analysis as the models' parameters are changed. The last part of the article presents a club theory analysis concerning the sharing of transnational commando forces.