Conditionalization, Observation, and Change of Preference
Conditionalization, Observation, and Change of Preference
复制标题
条件化、观察和偏好的改变
DOI：
10.1007/978-94-010-1853-1_9
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发表时间：
1976
期刊：
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
P. Teller
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
P. Teller
我认为贝叶斯主义是这样一种学说，它认为（i）一组合理的信念可以用在句子或命题上定义的概率函数来表示，并且（ii）信念的合理变化可以用称为条件化的过程来表示。贝叶斯主义者提出了几个巧妙的论据来支持（i）；但同样重要的第二个条件他们常常似乎完全认为是理所当然的。我的主要目的是填补那些将合理信念直接描述为概率函数的贝叶斯立场的空白。因此，接下来的内容同样适用于贝叶斯个人主义者的观点，这些观点将合理信念描述为具有主观来源，也适用于诸如卡尔纳普的观点，卡尔纳普试图明确定义一个函数，该函数表征理想化理性主体在给定情况下的给定命题中具有客观合理性的信念程度。许多频率论观点也可以归类为贝叶斯观点，我将从概率或合理信念程度的频率解释的角度简要讨论条件（ii）的合理性。在此过程中还会出现另外两个主题：信念的改变和偏好的改变之间的联系，以及条件化和观察之间的联系。
I take bayesianism to be the doctrine which maintains that (i) a set of reasonable beliefs can be represented by a probability function defined over sentences or propositions, and that (ii) reasonable changes of belief can be represented by a process called conditionalization. Bayesians have produced several ingenious arguments in support of (i); but the equally important second condition they often seem to take completely for granted. My main aim is to fill this gap in those bayesian positions which characterize reasonable belief directly as a probability function. Thus, what follows applies equally to the bayesian personalists’ views which characterize reasonable belief as having subjective sources and to views such as that of Carnap which attempt to explicitly define a function which characterizes the degree of belief it would be objectively reasonable for an idealized rational agent to have in a given proposition in stated circumstances. Many frequentist views are also classifiable as bayesian, and I will briefly discuss the justification of condition (ii) from the point of view of a frequency interpretation of probability or reasonable degree of belief. Two other topics will also come up along the way: the connection between change of belief and change of preference, and the connection between conditionalization and observation.