Tax competition, tax coordination, and e‐commerce
Tax competition, tax coordination, and e‐commerce
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税收竞争、税收协调和电子商务
DOI：
10.1111/jpet.12254
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Maya Bacache Beauvallet
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Maya Bacache Beauvallet
本文有助于欧洲商品税协调的政治辩论。在尼尔森的背景下，它研究了在线购物对税收和税收竞争的影响，并将基于目的地的税收与基于原产地的税收进行了对比。不同的消费者上网是有成本的。据推测，在互联网交易期间，由于逃税或存在纳税义务门槛，会出现财政漏损。虽然跨境购物有效地导致在原产地征税，但通过添加电子商务的这种模式表明，基于原产地原则对在线贸易征税可以软化税收竞争，并允许维持实体店的目的地原则。如果税收是基于原产地的，税收竞争就会减少，因为互联网有助于小国扩大税基，从而导致税收趋同。
This paper contributes to the political debate on commodity tax coordination in Europe. It examines, within Nielsen's setting, the impact of online shopping on taxes and tax competition and contrasts destination‐based taxation with origin‐based taxation. Heterogeneous consumers surf the Internet at a cost. It is assumed that fiscal leakage occurs during transactions on the Internet either because of tax evasion or of the existence of a tax liability threshold. Whereas cross‐border shopping effectively results in taxes being levied at origin, this model by adding e‐commerce shows that taxing online trade based on the origin principle softens tax competition and allows sustaining the destination principle on brick‐and‐mortar shops. Tax competition is reduced if tax is origin‐based, because the Internet helps the small country expand its tax base, which induces tax convergence.