Stirring up a hornets’ nest: Geographic distribution of crime
Stirring up a hornets’ nest: Geographic distribution of crime
复制标题
捅马蜂窝：犯罪的地理分布
DOI：
10.1016/j.jebo.2018.06.005
复制
发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Gustavo Torrens
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sebastian Galiani;Iván López Cruz;Gustavo Torrens
如何提高警察部署策略的效率正在成为犯罪经济学和执法经济学的重要研究议程。我们为这一议程做出了贡献，开发了第一个一般均衡模型，旨在研究警察保护的地理分布如何影响追求非法活动的决策、犯罪的强度和地点、居住选择、房价以及不同社会经济群体的福利。目标是探索城市地区警察力量空间分配的不同方式的积极和规范的长期影响。我们发现，当警察保护一些街区（集中保护）时，城市就会变得隔离，而当警察在城市中均匀部署（分散保护）时，就会出现一个一体化的城市。不平等的社会面临着一个困境，即集中保护使总福利最大化，但却加剧了社会差距。可以通过税收和补贴来抵消警察集中的弊端。私人保安使得一体化城市不太可能达到平衡。即使在分散的公共保护下，富有的特工也可能利用私人保安将自己孤立在封闭的社区中。
How to make police deployment strategies more efficient is becoming the crucial research agenda for the economics of crime and law enforcement. We contribute to this agenda developing the first general equilibrium model designed to study how the geographic distribution of police protection affects the decision to pursue illegal activities, the intensity and location of crime, residential choices, housing prices, and the welfare of different socioeconomic groups. The target is to explore the positive and normative long-run effects of different ways of spatially allocating police forces in an urban area. We find that, when the police protect some neighborhoods (concentrated protection), the city becomes segregated, while when the police are evenly deployed across the city (dispersed protection), an integrated city emerges. Unequal societies face a difficult dilemma in that concentrated protection maximizes aggregate welfare but exacerbates social disparities. Taxes and subsidies can be employed to offset the disadvantages of police concentration. Private security makes an integrated city less likely to occur in equilibrium. Even under dispersed public protection, rich agents may use private security to endogenously isolate themselves in closed neighborhoods.