Liability Design for Autonomous Vehicles and Human-Driven Vehicles: A Hierarchical Game-Theoretic Approach
Liability Design for Autonomous Vehicles and Human-Driven Vehicles: A Hierarchical Game-Theoretic Approach
复制标题
自动驾驶车辆和人力驾驶车辆的责任设计：分层博弈论方法
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
E. Talley
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xuan Di;Xu Chen;E. Talley
摘要自动驾驶汽车（AV）不可避免地进入我们的生活，具有改善交通安全、移动性和可达性的潜在好处。然而，自动驾驶汽车的好处也带来了一个严重的潜在挑战，即与人类驾驶车辆（HV）的复杂互动。自动驾驶汽车的出现给人类行为者的行为以及自动驾驶汽车制造商对自动驾驶设计的影响带来了不确定性。因此，本文的目的是调查如何自动驾驶汽车影响道路安全，并设计社会最佳的责任规则，在比较疏忽的自动驾驶汽车和人类驾驶员。开发了一个统一的游戏，包括人类驾驶员之间的纳什游戏，AV制造商和HV之间的Stackelberg游戏，以及立法者和其他用户之间的Stackelberg游戏。我们还建立了博弈均衡的存在性和唯一性。然后，通过数值模拟的例子来研究人类驾驶员道德风险的出现，AV制造商在交通安全中的作用，以及立法者在责任设计中的作用。我们的研究结果表明，人类驾驶员可能会发展道德风险，如果他们认为他们的道路环境变得更安全，最佳的责任规则设计是至关重要的，以提高社会福利与先进的交通技术。更一般地说，本文开发的博弈论模型提供了一个分析工具，以协助政策制定者在AV政策制定，并希望减轻现有的监管景观有关AV技术的不确定性。
Abstract Autonomous vehicles (AVs) are inevitably entering our lives with potential benefits for improved traffic safety, mobility, and accessibility. However, AVs’ benefits also introduce a serious potential challenge, in the form of complex interactions with human-driven vehicles (HVs). The emergence of AVs introduces uncertainty in the behavior of human actors and in the impact of the AV manufacturer on autonomous driving design. This paper thus aims to investigate how AVs affect road safety and to design socially optimal liability rules in comparative negligence for AVs and human drivers. A unified game is developed, including a Nash game between human drivers, a Stackelberg game between the AV manufacturer and HVs, and a Stackelberg game between the lawmaker and other users. We also establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the game. The game is then simulated with numerical examples to investigate the emergence of human drivers’ moral hazard, the AV manufacturer’s role in traffic safety, and the lawmaker’s role in liability design. Our findings demonstrate that human drivers could develop moral hazard if they perceive their road environment has become safer and an optimal liability rule design is crucial to improve social welfare with advanced transportation technologies. More generally, the game-theoretic model developed in this paper provides an analytical tool to assist policy-makers in AV policymaking and hopefully mitigate uncertainty in the existing regulation landscape about AV technologies.
DOI：
10.1109/itsc.2019.8917021
发表时间：
2019-06
期刊：
2019 IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Conference (ITSC)
影响因子：
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作者：
Kuang Huang;Xuan Di;Q. Du;Xi Chen
通讯作者：
Kuang Huang;Xuan Di;Q. Du;Xi Chen
DOI：
10.1016/j.trc.2020.01.007
发表时间：
2020-02
影响因子：
8.3
作者：
Kuang Huang;Xuan Di;Q. Du;Xi Chen
通讯作者：
Kuang Huang;Xuan Di;Q. Du;Xi Chen