A VETO GAME PLAYED BY BABOONS - A CHALLENGE TO THE USE OF THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA AS A PARADIGM FOR RECIPROCITY AND COOPERATION
A VETO GAME PLAYED BY BABOONS - A CHALLENGE TO THE USE OF THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA AS A PARADIGM FOR RECIPROCITY AND COOPERATION
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DOI：
10.1016/s0003-3472(05)80728-6
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发表时间：
1990-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2.5
通讯作者：
NOE, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
NOE, R
根据广泛接受的范式，动物之间的合作类似于迭代的两人囚犯的困境游戏。在这个对称游戏中，两个玩家都有同等的战略选择。决策仅基于过去与同一玩家的类似互动中获得的信息。囚犯的困境模式忽略了发生合作的社会组织。本文提倡一组基于N-Player联盟游戏的替代模型，这些模型特别适用于社会群体内的协作（即合作和互惠）。该模型考虑了对合适合作伙伴的竞争的影响。在联盟游戏中，谈判是可能的，玩家的战略选择可能是不平等的。联盟游戏，否决游戏的一个例子是通过一群野生狒狒Papio c中的成年男性组成的模式来说明的。 cynocephalus。
According to a widely accepted paradigm, cooperation among animals resembles an iterated, two-player Prisoner''s Dilemma game. In this symmetrical game the two players have equivalent strategic options. Decisions are based only on information obtained in similar interactions with the same player in the past. The Prisoner''s Dilemma model ignores the social organization within which cooperation occurs. This paper advocates a set of alternative models based on N-player coalition games that apply especially to collaboration (that is, cooperation and reciprocity) within social groups. The model takes into account the effect of competition for the favours of suitable partners. In Coalition games negotiations are possible and the strategic options of the players can be unequal. An example of a Coalition game, the Veto game, is illustrated by patterns of coalition formation among adult males in a group of wild baboons Papio c. cynocephalus.