Optimal assertions, and what they implicate. A uniform game theoretic approach
Optimal assertions, and what they implicate. A uniform game theoretic approach
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DOI：
10.1007/s11245-006-9007-3
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发表时间：
2007-01-01
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
van Rooij, Robert
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Benz, Anton;van Rooij, Robert
为了确定合作对话中说话者的断言意味着什么，除了他明确说的话之外，我们还必须假设他给出的断言是最优的。在确定最佳断言时，我们假设对话框嵌入决策问题中（货车Rooij 2003），并使用反向归纳法计算它们（Benz 2006）。在本文中，我们表明，根据我们的框架，我们可以以统一的方式解释几种类型的含义，这表明不需要一个独立的广义含义语言学理论。在最后一节中，我们展示了如何将我们的理论嵌入到信号博弈的框架中，以及它如何与其他含义的博弈论分析相关联。
To determine what the speaker in a cooperative dialog meant with his assertion, on top of what he explicitly said, it is crucial that we assume that the assertion he gave was optimal. In determining optimal assertions we assume that dialogs are embedded in decision problems (van Rooij 2003) and use backwards induction for calculating them (Benz 2006). In this paper, we show that in terms of our framework we can account for several types of implicatures in a uniform way, suggesting that there is no need for an independent linguistic theory of generalized implicatures. In the final section, we show how we can embed our theory in the framework of signaling games, and how it relates with other game theoretic analyses of implicatures.