Common Ownership in America: 1980-2017
Common Ownership in America: 1980-2017
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美国共同所有权：1980-2017
DOI：
10.3386/w25454
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Michael Sinkinson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Backus;Christopher T. Conlon;Michael Sinkinson
当相互竞争的公司拥有重叠的投资者集合时，最大化股东价值可能提供扭曲竞争行为的激励，影响定价、进入、签约，以及公司之间几乎所有的战略互动。我们提出了一种结构上一致且可扩展的方法来衡量1980年至2017年间S 500指数成份股公司的这一现象。在这段时间里，共同所有权假说所隐含的激励措施大幅增长。与流行的直觉相反，这主要与贝莱德和Van-Guard的崛起无关：相反，时间序列的趋势是由多元化投资策略的更广泛兴起推动的，这些公司只是最新的化身。在横截面上，无论是在理论上还是在数据上，都可以追溯到可观察到的公司特征--特别是散户投资者持有的公司份额。最后，我们展示了共同所有制如何在理论上产生激励，通过隧道行为剥夺非多元化股东，即使在伯利和Means(1932)的“广泛持有的公司”的世界也是如此。
When competing firms possess overlapping sets of investors, maximizing shareholder value may provide incentives that distort competitive behavior, affecting pricing, entry, contracting, and virtually all strategic interactions among firms. We propose a structurally consistent and scaleable approach to the measurement of this phenomenon for the universe of S&P 500 firms between 1980 and 2017. Over this period, the incentives implied by the common ownership hypothesis have grown dramatically. Contrary to popular intuition, this is not primarily associated with the rise of BlackRock and Van- guard: instead, the trend in the time series is driven by a broader rise in diversified investment strategies, of which these firms are only the most recent incarnation. In the cross-section, there is substantial variation that can be traced, both in the theory and the data, to observable firm characteristics – particularly the share of the firm held by retail investors. Finally, we show how common ownership can theoretically give rise to incentives for expropriation of undiversified shareholders via tunneling, even in the Berle and Means (1932) world of the “widely held firm.”