Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
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弗雷格之谜和可信对象
作者：
D. Chalmers
信任的对象是为了一个成功的信任理论而被赋予信任的实体。我使用类似于弗雷格之谜的案例来反对关于信任的指称论：认为信任的对象是由一个人的信任所针对的对象和属性决定的。我继续发展一个非参照帐户的对象的信任方面的一套认识上可能的情况。
The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege’s puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence: the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties that one’s credence is directed at. I go on to develop a nonreferential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.