Auditory Eyesight: Demystifying μs-Precision Keystroke Tracking Attacks on Unconstrained Keyboard Inputs
Auditory Eyesight: Demystifying μs-Precision Keystroke Tracking Attacks on Unconstrained Keyboard Inputs
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发表时间：
2023
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通讯作者：
Yazhou Tu;Liqun Shan;Md. Imran Hossen;Sara Rampazzi;Kevin R. B. Butler;X. Hei
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作者：
Yazhou Tu;Liqun Shan;Md. Imran Hossen;Sara Rampazzi;Kevin R. B. Butler;X. Hei
在从系统登录到编写电子邮件、文档和表单的各种场景中，键盘输入携带诱人的数据，如用户名、密码、地址和ID。由于普遍存在的非字母输入、标点符号和打字错误，用户的自然输入很少仅包含受约束的纯字母键/词。本文研究了如何利用听觉接口来显示无约束的键盘输入。音频接口并不旨在具有光传感器（诸如摄像机）的能力来识别复杂定位的键。我们的分析表明，有效地区分键可能需要一个很好的定位精度水平的声音接近微秒的范围。这项工作（1）探索了音频接口的局限性，以区分杂音，（2）提出了一个μ s级定制的信号处理和基于分析的杂音跟踪方法，考虑到机械物理和不完美的测量杂音的声音，（3）首次对非纯字母键的无约束键盘输入进行了声学侧信道攻击研究;单词，并且不一定遵循给定字典或训练数据集中的已知序列，以及（4）揭示了非视线语音跟踪的威胁。我们的研究结果表明，在不依赖视觉传感器的情况下，使用有限分辨率音频接口的攻击可以通过相当尖锐和可弯曲的“听觉视觉”来揭示来自键盘的不受约束的输入。
In various scenarios from system login to writing emails, documents, and forms, keyboard inputs carry alluring data such as usernames, passwords, addresses, and IDs. Due to commonly existing non-alphabetic inputs, punctuation, and typos, users’ natural inputs rarely contain only constrained, purely alphabetic keys/words. This work studies how to reveal unconstrained keyboard inputs using auditory interfaces. Audio interfaces are not intended to have the capability of light sensors such as cameras to identify compactly located keys. Our analysis shows that effectively distinguishing the keys can require a fine localization precision level of keystroke sounds close to the range of microseconds. This work (1) explores the limits of audio interfaces to distinguish keystrokes, (2) proposes a µ s-level customized signal processing and analysis-based keystroke tracking approach that takes into account the mechanical physics and imperfect measuring of keystroke sounds, (3) develops the first acoustic side-channel attack study on unconstrained keyboard inputs that are not purely alphabetic keys/words and do not necessarily follow known sequences in a given dictionary or training dataset, and (4) reveals the threats of non-line-of-sight keystroke sound tracking. Our results indicate that, without relying on vision sensors, attacks using limited-resolution audio interfaces can reveal unconstrained inputs from the keyboard with a fairly sharp and bendable “auditory eyesight.”