Electoral systems, voters’ interests and geographic dispersion
Electoral systems, voters’ interests and geographic dispersion
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选举制度、选民利益和地域分散
DOI：
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发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Rickard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Rickard
人们普遍认为，民主制度决定了政治家迎合某些选区的动机，但哪种选举制度使政治家最能满足狭隘利益，仍有争议。一些人认为，多数选举规则为政治家提供了最大的激励，以迎合少数人的利益;其他人说，比例制度促使政治家相对更倾向于狭隘的利益。这项研究表明，在不同的条件下，这两种立场都是正确的。当选民在地理上集中时，政治家在多元化制度中竞争，使具有共同狭隘利益的选民享有特权，但当他们在地理上分散时，这些选民在比例选举制度中具有更大的政治影响力。14个发达国家的政府补贴支出为这一论点提供了实证支持。
There is general agreement that democratic institutions shape politicians’ incentives to cater to certain constituencies, but which electoral system causes politicians to be most responsive to narrow interests is still debateable. Some argue that plurality electoral rules provide the greatest incentives for politicians to cater to the interests of a few; others say proportional systems prompt politicians to be relatively more prone to narrow interests. This study suggests that both positions can be correct under different conditions. Politicians competing in plurality systems privilege voters with a shared narrow interest when such voters are geographically concentrated, but when they are geographically diffuse, such voters have greater political influence in proportional electoral systems. Government spending on subsidies in fourteen developed countries provides empirical support for this argument.