AM I A RACIST? IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE ASCRIPTION OF RACISM
AM I A RACIST? IMPLICIT BIAS AND THE ASCRIPTION OF RACISM
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DOI：
10.1093/pq/pqw070
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发表时间：
2017-07-01
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Levy, Neil
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Levy, Neil
有充分的证据表明，许多人所持有的态度与他们所赞同的态度相冲突。用社会心理学的语言来说，他们似乎有着与他们明确的信念相冲突的内隐态度。人们对这样的行为者是否要对他们的隐性态度所引起的行为负责的问题给予了大量的关注，但对他们是否可以因为窝藏他们而被正确地描述为（比如说）种族主义者的问题却关注得少得多。在本文中，我试图用三种不同的标准来回答这个问题，这三种标准是由种族主义的三种主要类型（doxastic，行为和情感）提供的。我认为，在这些帐户都不应该像这样的代理人被描述为种族主义者。然而，如果不加限制地说他们不是种族主义者，那将是误导。在这些账户中没有一个是完全摆脱嫌疑的。
There is good evidence that many people harbour attitudes that conflict with those they endorse. In the language of social psychology, they seem to have implicit attitudes that conflict with their explicit beliefs. There has been a great deal of attention paid to the question whether agents like this are responsible for actions caused by their implicit attitudes, but much less to the question whether they can rightly be described as (say) racist in virtue of harbouring them. In this paper, I attempt to answer this question using three different standards, providing by the three dominant kinds of accounts of racism (doxastic, behavioural and affective). I argue that on none of these accounts should agents like this be described as racists. However, it would be misleading to say, without qualification, that they are not racists. On none of these accounts are agents like this entirely off the hook.