Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory relationship
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DOI：
10.1007/s00712-015-0456-2
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发表时间：
2016-03
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Raffaele Fiocco;M. Gilli
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Raffaele Fiocco;M. Gilli
我们研究监管作为一个监管机构和被监管企业之间的讨价还价过程的结果。监管机构必须监督公司的成本，并向政治负责人（国会）披露其信息。在这种背景下，我们探讨了监管机构与公司之间勾结的范围，这导致监管机构向国会提交的公司成本报告被操纵。当监管机构报告说效率低下时，效率高的公司可以收取更高的价格，这使得公司从合谋中获益。然而，较高的价格减少了各方在谈判过程中可以分享的贸易收益。作为这种权衡的结果，只有当监管者在监管关系中的讨价还价能力相对较高时，有效企业才有合谋的利害关系。然后，我们推导出最优的制度响应共谋和特征的条件下，允许共谋是可取的。
We investigate regulation as the outcome of a bargaining process between a regulator and a regulated firm. The regulator is required to monitor the firm’s costs and to reveal its information to a political principal (Congress). In this setting, we explore the scope for collusion between the regulator and the firm, which results in the manipulation of the regulator’s report on the firm’s costs to Congress. The firm’s benefit of collusion arises from the higher price the efficient firm is allowed to charge when the regulator reports that it is inefficient. However, a higher price reduces the gains from trade the parties can share in the bargaining process. As a result of this trade-off, the efficient firm has a stake in collusion only if the regulator’s bargaining power in the regulatory relationship is relatively high. Then, we derive the optimal institutional response to collusion and characterize the conditions under which allowing collusion is desirable.