Incentive Effects of Bonus Payments: Evidence from an International Company
Incentive Effects of Bonus Payments: Evidence from an International Company
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奖金支付的激励效应：来自一家国际公司的证据
DOI：
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Riphahn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Axel Engellandt;R. Riphahn
本研究使用一家大型跨国公司约6,500名员工的面板数据来研究绩效工资的激励效果。该公司采用两种与绩效相关的薪酬机制。一是个人“突击”发放奖金。另一种是结构性更强的制度，部分薪金由个人业绩评估决定。我们假设，努力是更高的部门，（一）绩效评估结果更分散，（二）个人的具体绩效评估是随着时间的推移更灵活，（三）惊喜奖金使用更频繁。这些假设是测试使用天数的缺席和加班工作的努力指标。检验结果表明，假设（ii）和（iii）得到了支持，并且由于我们数据中可能存在的一致性偏倚，假设（i）无法可靠地进行检验。我们调查并证实了这些发现的稳健性。他们认为，意外的奖金支付和随着时间的推移对个人业绩进行评估的灵活性为员工的努力提供了有效的激励。
This study uses panel data describing about 6,500 employees in a large international company to study the incentive effects of performance related pay. The company uses two performance related remuneration mechanisms. One is an individual "surprise" bonus payment. The other is a more structured system, where part of the salary is determined by individual performance evaluations. We hypothesize that effort is higher in departments where (i) performance evaluation results are more spread out, (ii) person-specific performance evaluations are more flexible over time, (iii) surprise bonuses are used more frequently. These hypotheses are tested using days of absence and overtime work as effort indicators. The tests yield that hypotheses (ii) and (iii) are supported, and that (i) cannot be tested reliably due to possible simultaneity bias in our data. We investigate and confirm the robustness of these findings. They suggest that surprise bonus payments and flexibility in the evaluation of individual performances over time provide effective incentives for employee effort.