The geopolitical hijacking of open networking: the case of Open RAN
The geopolitical hijacking of open networking: the case of Open RAN
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开放网络的地缘政治劫持：Open RAN 案例
DOI：
10.1177/02673231211028375
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
J. Plantin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Plantin
本文探讨了开放网络技术的话语如何提供一种社会想象，工业和政府行动者动员起来，试图扩大他们对移动的电信网络的控制。最近旨在以“开放RAN”模式“开放”无线电接入网络（或RAN，电信基础设施的关键组成部分）的举措的案例揭示了美国政府如何推动这种新兴技术，以在其自己的“开放”电信网络与基于外国设备的专有和假定的“不可信”网络之间建立对立，即华为。虽然仔细观察会对开放无线电接入网络增加网络安全或开放设备市场的好处产生怀疑，但这一案例揭示了开放是一个模糊的概念，可以被政府用来排除外国贸易敌人，同时倡导对电信网络的信任。
This article investigates how discourses on open networking technologies provide a social imaginary that industry and government actors mobilize in an attempt to expand their control over mobile telecommunications networks. The case of recent initiatives aiming to ‘open up’ radio access network (or RAN, a key component of telecommunications infrastructure) with an ‘open RAN’ model reveals how the US Government came to promote this nascent technology to create an opposition between its own ‘open’ telecommunications networks versus proprietary and presumed ‘untrustworthy’ networks based on foreign equipment, namely Huawei. While a closer look casts doubts on the benefits of open radio access network to increase network security or to open up the equipment market, this case reveals how openness is an ambiguous notion that can be used by governments to exclude foreign trade enemies, while advocating for trust in telecommunications networks.
影响因子：
5
作者：
J. Plantin;C. Lagoze;P. N. Edwards;Christian Sandvig
通讯作者：
J. Plantin;C. Lagoze;P. N. Edwards;Christian Sandvig